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ABSTRACT

THE GLOBAL SETTLEMENT, ALL-STAR ANALYST DEPARTURES,
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE CAPITAL MARKETS
Xin Wu Mahaney-Walter
Luke Taylor
The Global Research Analyst Settlement prohibited twelve large investment banks from tying equity analysts’ compensation to investment banking revenues, causing a large number
of Institutional Investor “all-star” analysts to exit the sell-side industry. Using a differencein-differences specification, I find that the departure of all-stars caused their bank-industry
underwriting groups to lose equity issuance market share. Market share losses were more
severe for IPOs than for IPOs and follow-on underwritings combined. The higher the average quality of all-stars in a bank-industry, the more severe were the bank-industry’s losses.
Additionally, the departure of all-stars raised the cost of equity capital for IPOs underwritten by their bank-industry groups, particularly for IPOs that were more difficult to value.
Ultimately, the loss of sell-side research talent, an unintended consequence of regulation,
forced issuers to accept research coverage of inferior quality, raising the cost of obtaining
public capital.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The Global Research Analyst Settlement (the “Global Settlement”) is an enforcement agreement proposed in December 2002 and finalized on April 28, 2003, among the SEC, the
NASD, the NYSE, the New York State Attorney General and ten (later twelve) of the thenlargest investment banks operating in the United States.1 Allegedly, from approximately
mid-1999 through mid-2001, under the pressure to attract investment banking business, research analysts at these banks had been generating research that was tainted by conflicts
of interest. The goal of the Global Settlement was to restore the integrity of research by
severing the ties between the banks’ research and investment banking divisions. Under the
terms of the agreement, the banks were required to make total payments approximating
$1.5 billion, including $942 million in disgorgement and penalties, $85 million for investor
education, and $460 million to fund independent research. In addition, the banks were required to separate their research and investment banking divisions, adhere to new disclosure
rules, and make independent research available to their investing customers by contracting
with independent research firms.
This paper studies the impact of the Global Settlement on the capital markets. How did
the Global Settlement affect the investment banking deal flow of the sanctioned banks or
equity issuers’ underwriter choices? How did the Global Settlement affect the cost of equity
capital for issuances underwritten by the sanctioned banks?
These questions are motivated by the evidence documented in Guan, Lu, and Wong (2013)
that an exceptionally large number of “all-star” analysts – as named by the Institutional
1

The original ten investment banks included in the Global Settlement are Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.;
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.); Credit Suisse First Boston LLC; Goldman,
Sachs & Co.; J.P. Morgan Securities Inc.; Lehman Brothers Inc.; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated; Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated; UBS Warburg LLC; and U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC joined the settlement in August 2004.
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Investor magazine annually for every classified industry – exited the sell-side research profession in the post-Settlement period, due to changes in their banks’ analyst compensation
structures as required by the settlement agreement. Specifically, the agreement prohibits
research analysts from participating in the solicitation of investment banking business, including any investment-banking-sponsored pitches and roadshows. Furthermore, the agreement requires that an analyst’s compensation not be based directly or indirectly upon investment banking revenues or input from investment banking personnel, but that it should
be based in significant part on the quality and accuracy of the analyst’s research.
Since investment banking contributions was one of the major factors in determining an analyst’s compensation prior to the Global Settlement (Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011)),
the settlement brought significant reforms to the ways in which analysts were compensated. Using proprietary compensation data from a major investment bank, Groysberg et
al. document that median total analyst compensation decreased from a peak of $1,148,435
in 2001 to $647,500 in 2005, driven almost exclusively by variation in bonuses, the median of which decreased from a peak of $940,007 in 2001 to $450,000 in 2005. Guan
et al. find that investment bank research analysts were on average more likely to leave
the sell-side research profession in the post-Settlement period, and that the increase in the
propensity of all-star analysts to exit the sell side was significantly higher than the corresponding increase for non-all-star analysts, which is consistent with all-star analysts earning significantly more than their unranked peers (Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011)).
Additionally, banks appeared to be unable to retain their all-star analysts by promoting
or transferring them to positions with higher earnings potential or better career prospects;
moving to the buy side – presumably for more lucrative opportunities – became a much
more attractive career option in the post-Settlement period for all-star analysts. What were
the economic consequences of the loss of top sell-side research talent, caused by a decline
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in compensation and perhaps by dimming career prospects?
I use a difference-in-differences specification with a sample period from 1998 to 2007. I
define the “event years” to be 2002 and 2003 for two reasons. First, the Global Settlement
was proposed in 2002, following extensive investigations into the business practices of the
sanctioned banks, making its effectiveness in 2003 a highly-anticipated event in 2002. Second, new rules became effective in 2002 through the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) the NASD and the NYSE - to address conflicts of interest between research and investment
banking, which closely mirrored the terms under the Global Settlement and applied to virtually all brokerages. My study focuses on the twelve investment banks sanctioned in the
Global Settlement since these banks were likely to be under the most regulatory pressure
to reform. My “treatment” group contains bank-industries that had at least one research
analyst named an all-star by Institutional Investor in the pre-Settlement period. My unit of
observation is at the bank-industry-year level. I include bank-year and industry-year fixed
effects in all regression specifications to control for time-varying differences across banks
and industries.
I find that a bank-industry that had at least one all-star analyst in the pre-Settlement period
on average suffered losses in its equity issuance market share in the post-Settlement period, relative to a bank-industry that did not have an all-star analyst in the pre-Settlement
period. Market share losses were more severe for IPO underwritings than for IPO and
follow-on underwritings combined, likely due to the stickiness of underwriting relationships. My difference-in-differences coefficients indicate that the relative losses average
2.96% in market share for IPO and follow-on underwritings combined, and 3.79% in market share for IPO underwritings alone, equivalent to relative losses of about $15 million and
$9 million per “treatment” bank-industry, respectively, in total underwriting fees between
2004 and 2007. Whereas the average market share is 0.93% to 2.06% higher for the “treat-
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ment” bank-industries than for the “control” bank-industries in the pre-Settlement period,
the “treatment” bank-industries’ relative losses bring these percentages down to negative
levels in the post-Settlement period, making the relative losses economically significant.
Results remain qualitatively similar when I limit my sample to include only market share
observations that are computed from industry-years with at least three equity issuances in
total. A placebo test using an identical methodology and a sample period from 1990 to
1999 yields no statistically significant results, indicating that the aforementioned patterns
observed in the 1998-2007 period are likely due to the Global Settlement.
One explanation for these results is my “Departure Hypothesis,” which states that the postSettlement departure of all-star analysts from the sell-side industry caused the analysts’
bank-industry underwriting groups to suffer losses in equity issuance market share relative
to bank-industry groups that did not have all-star analysts to begin with. This hypothesis
is motivated by two strands of literature. The first strand of literature documents that allstar analysts exhibit superior performance relative to non-all-star analysts (e.g., Bonner,
Hugon, and Walther (2007); Fang and Yasuda (2009, 2014); Gleason and Lee (2003);
Leone and Wu (2007); Stickel (1992)). The second strand of literature documents that
equity issuers place a high value on securing high-quality research coverage (e.g., Clarke,
Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2007); Dunbar (2000); Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001);
Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006)).
Consistent with the Departure Hypothesis, I first document that 68.33% of my treatment
bank-industries had at least one all-star analyst departure from the sell side in the postSettlement period. Next, my descriptive statistics show that, compared to non-all-star analysts, all-star analysts were on average more accurate and timely in their earnings forecasts,
issued more earnings revisions, and were less optimistically biased in both their earnings
forecasts and their stock recommendations. Last, I show that the higher the average qual4

ity of all-star analysts in a treatment bank-industry in the pre-Settlement period, the more
severe the bank-industry’s post-Settlement losses. For example, losses were more severe
in bank-industries that had a repeat (i.e., multi-year) all-star than in bank-industries that
did not have a repeat all-star. Additionally, losses were more severe in bank-industries
in which the all-star analysts were more accurate in their earnings forecasts, issued more
earnings revisions, and were less optimistically biased in their earnings forecasts and stock
recommendations.
These results are inconsistent with my alternative “Optimism Hypothesis” as an explanation for the treatment bank-industries’ post-Settlement market share losses relative to the
control bank-industries. This hypothesis posits that all-star analysts became much less
likely to publish overly optimistic research in the post-Settlement period than they had
been in the pre-Settlement period, thus driving away potential investment banking clients.
One assumption behind this hypothesis is that all-star analysts were more likely to be optimistically biased than non-all-star analysts in the pre-Settlement period. An empirical
prediction is that the more optimistically biased were a bank-industry’s all-star analysts in
the pre-Settlement period, the more severe were the bank-industry’s post-Settlement market share losses. Both the assumption and the prediction are rejected by my aforementioned
results.
Turning to the impact of the Global Settlement on the cost of equity capital – which I measure using equity issuance underpricing – I consider two hypotheses that generate opposite
empirical predictions. My “Changing Risk Hypothesis” states that the departure of all-star
analysts introduces valuation risk into equity issuances underwritten by the bank-industries
from which they depart, raising the level of underpricing demanded by investors. Furthermore, the rise in underpricing would be more pronounced for issuances that are intrinsically more difficult to value. My “Analyst Lust Hypothesis,” on the other hand, assumes
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that underwriters always want to underprice equity issuances. This hypothesis states that as
all-star analysts depart from their bank-industries, equity issuers become less willing to tolerate underpricing for the benefit of high-quality analyst coverage, thus lowering the level
of underpricing. The decrease in underpricing could be more pronounced for issuances that
are intrinsically more difficult to value.2
I use a triple-difference specification to compare the effect of the Global Settlement on the
cost of equity capital between issuances with high valuation risk and those with low valuation risk. I use two measures of valuation risk. The first measure is whether an issuer
belongs in a high-technology industry, assuming that tech issuances are more difficult to
value than non-tech issuances. The second measure is issuer age, assuming that issuances
from younger issuers are more difficult to value than those from older issuers. I find that,
whereas the effect of the Analyst Lust Hypothesis dominates in the subgroup of low-risk
IPOs, a positive triple-difference coefficient indicates that the Changing Risk Hypothesis
plays a more important role in the subgroup of high-risk IPOs than in the subgroup of
low-risk IPOs. Specifically, the differential effect of the Global Settlement on the cost of
equity capital between these two groups of issuances amounts to an economically significant 17.8% in underpricing, equivalent to an average amount of money left on the table of
about $34 million.
The existing literature provides little empirical evidence regarding the impact of the Global
Settlement on the capital markets. The contribution of my paper is to fill this void in the
literature. My results suggest that the quality of analyst coverage remains an important
determinant of equity underwriter choice in spite of the Global Settlement’s restrictions
on analyst participation in equity issuances. I show that the departure of some of the most
highly-regarded research analysts from the sell-side industry, as an unintended consequence
2

Both the "Changing Risk Hypothesis" and the "Analyst Lust Hypothesis" are adapted from Loughran
and Ritter (2004), who examine the reasons for changes in IPO underpricing levels between 1980 and 2003.
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of well-intentioned regulation, has not only caused issuing companies to reconsider their
underwriter choices, but more importantly has forced issuing companies to accept research
coverage of inferior quality, even though companies place a high value on securing highquality research coverage from sell-side analysts. I also find suggestive evidence that the
departure of all-star analysts has introduced valuation risk into IPOs underwritten by the
bank-industries from which they have departed, raising the cost of equity capital, particularly for IPOs that are more difficult to value. For these reasons, the disappearance of
high-quality research coverage could be deterring companies from seeking public capital,
limiting their options in obtaining resources necessary for growth, impairing the efficiency
of the equity capital markets and of the real economy.
A few papers have found empirical evidence supporting the concerns that motivated the
Global Settlement. For example, in the pre-Settlement period, affiliated analysts – analysts whose banks were also a company’s underwriters – were on average faster to upgrade
and slower to downgrade a company’s stock recommendations than were non-affiliated
analysts; their buy recommendations underperformed – and their hold and sell recommendations outperformed – those of non-affiliated analysts (e.g., Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman
(2007); Cliff (2004); Lin, McNichols, and O’Brien (2005)).
On the impact of the Global Settlement and related conflict of interest regulations on the
quality of analyst stock recommendations, a few papers find that, post-Settlement, stock
recommendations became less affected by conflicts of interest and more consistent with intrinsic value estimates based on analysts’ earnings forecasts, suggesting that regulation enhanced analysts’ independence (e.g., Barniv, Hope, Myring, and Thomas (2009); Bradshaw
(2009); Chen and Chen (2009)). Furthermore, optimistic recommendations became less
frequent and more informative, neutral and pessimistic recommendations became more frequent and less informative, and overall informativeness of stock recommendations declined
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(e.g., Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006); Boni (2005); Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2011); Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009)). The decline in the overall
informativeness of stock recommendations likely resulted from the departure of some of the
most talented research analysts from the sell-side industry, as documented in Guan, Lu and
Wong (2013) and in this paper.
Lastly, a number of papers compare the quality of stock recommendations among different types of research providers. For example, although the Global Settlement only sanctioned twelve investment banks, the sanctioned banks’ recommendation practices did not
differ from those of other investment banks in the pre-Settlement period; sanctioned banks’
stock recommendations, however, became much more conservative and much less informative in the post-Settlement period than those of other investment banks (e.g., Barber,
Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006); Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009)).
Settlement-funded independent research firms provided lower-quality and less informative
stock recommendations than investment banks and independent research firms that did not
participate in the Global Settlement or receive Settlement funds, likely due to the lack of
experience of the research analysts employed by these relatively new independent research
firms (e.g., Buslepp, Casey, and Huston (2014); Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2011)).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes my research design
and hypotheses. Section 3 describes my data and presents summary statistics. Section 4
presents my results. Section 4.1 presents results on the impact of the Global Settlement
on the investment banking deal flow of the sanctioned banks, and Section 4.2 presents
results on the impact of the Global Settlement on the cost of equity capital for issuances
underwritten by the sanctioned banks. Section 5 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
2.1. Research Design
I estimate the effect of the Global Settlement using a difference-in-differences framework.
My sample period is from 1998 to 2007. I define 2002 and 2003 to be the “event years,”
1998-2001 to be the “pre-Settlement period,” and 2004-2007 to be the “post-Settlement
period.” My sample contains the twelve sanctioned banks. My “treatment” group contains
bank-industries that had at least one all-star analyst during 1998-2001, provided that the
analyst stayed with the bank-industry until the end of 2001. I exclude a bank-industry
from the treatment group if its all-star analyst(s) exited the sell-side industry, or moved to
another sell-side firm, prior to the end of 2001. If the analyst continued to be named an
all-star after arriving at the new sell-side firm, I assign the new firm’s bank-industry to the
treatment group. If the analyst was no longer named an all-star after arriving at the new sellside firm, I assign the new firm’s bank-industry to the “control” group. Table 1 presents the
treatment group, which contains a total of 341 bank-industries across the twelve sanctioned
banks. Piper Jaffray has zero observations in the treatment group since this bank did not
have an all-star analyst during 1998-2001.
My regression specification is as follows:

yijt =

T reatmentij +

T reatmentij

P ostt +

it

+

jt

+

ijt

(1)

yijt is the dependent variable for bank i, industry j, and year t. T reatmentij is an indicator
that equals 1 for observations that belong in the treatment group, and 0 otherwise. P ostt
is an indicator that equals 1 for observations from the post-Settlement period, and 0 for
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observations from the pre-Settlement period.3 The coefficient ( ) on the interaction term
T reatmentij

P ostt is the difference-in-differences coefficient of interest.

In order to investigate whether the Global Settlement had an “effect” prior to its announcement, I estimate the following regression to examine the dynamics of the difference-indifferences coefficient:
yijt =
+

T reatmentij +
3

T reatmentij

1

T reatmentij

GS(+1)t +

4

GS( 1)t +

T reatmentij

2

T reatmentij

GS(2+)t +

it

+

GS(0)t
jt

+

ijt

(2)

GS( 1)t is an indicator for one year before the event years (2001), GS(0)t is an indicator
for the event years (2002 and 2003), GS(+1)t is an indicator for one year after the event
years (2004), and GS(2+)t is an indicator for two or more years after the event years (2005
to 2007). If the Global Settlement had a causal effect on the capital markets, the effect
should show up only after the announcement of the regulation and not before. In other
words, the coefficient on T reatmentij GS( 1)t should be statistically insignificant, and
the effect of the regulation should be reflected in later years.
In both specification (1) and specification (2), I include bank-year (
(

jt )

it )

and industry-year

fixed effects to control for time-varying differences across banks and industries. Co-

efficients are estimated by ordinary least squares, and robust standard errors are clustered
at the bank level.
3

I exclude observations from the event years, 2002 and 2003, from my analysis under specification (1).
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2.2. Hypotheses and Predictions
This section presents four hypotheses and their empirical predictions. To study the impact
of the Global Settlement on the investment banking deal flow of the sanctioned banks, I
examine the Departure Hypothesis and the Optimism Hypothesis. To study the impact of
the Global Settlement on the cost of equity capital – measured by equity issuance underpricing – for issuances underwritten by the sanctioned banks, I examine the Changing Risk
Hypothesis and the Analyst Lust Hypothesis.
2.2.1. Departure Hypothesis
Both the Global Settlement and the SRO regulations prohibited investment banks from
tying research analysts’ compensation to their investment banking contributions. As documented in Guan, Lu, and Wong (2013), both all-star analysts and non-all-star analysts
from investment banks exited the sell-side research industry at increased rates in the postSettlement period, but the increase in the rate of departure was significantly higher for
all-star analysts. This result is unsurprising given that all-star analysts have been found
to receive 61% higher total compensation than their unranked peers, at a major, unnamed
investment bank (Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011)). Guan et al. find that, in the postSettlement period, the higher the level of investment banking activities in an all-star analyst’s core industry, the higher the propensity of the all-star analyst to exit the sell side,
inconsistent with analyst departures being driven by a decline in the demand for their research services. Among the all-star analysts who exited the sell side, 32.32% moved to
buy-side firms, up from 24.71% in the pre-Settlement period. This 7.61% increase is the
largest percentage point increase among all all-star career choice categories, suggesting
that the buy side became a much more attractive career choice in the post-Settlement period. There was no significant change in the percentage of all-star analysts being promoted
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to managerial positions or transferred to different departments within the same bank (e.g.,
investment banking), suggesting that banks were unable to retain their all-star analysts by
relocating them to positions with higher pay or improved career prospects.
The Departure Hypothesis posits that the loss of an all-star analyst impairs her bank’s
ability to obtain investment banking mandates in the all-star analyst’s industry, more than
the loss of a non-all-star analyst would. This hypothesis is motivated by two strands of
literature.
In the first strand of literature, all-star analysts are found to demonstrate superior performance compared to their unranked peers (e.g., Bonner, Hugon, and Walther (2007); Fang
and Yasuda (2009, 2014); Gleason and Lee (2003); Leone and Wu (2007); Stickel (1992)).
For example, all-star analysts provide more accurate earnings forecasts, more frequent coverage, and more profitable stock recommendations. They are less likely to herd with other
analysts, and their superior performance is persisting. Their stock recommendations are
followed by stronger market reactions, a sign that the market perceives all-star analysts to
be more credible.
In the second strand of literature, equity issuers are found to highly value high-quality
research coverage (e.g., Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2007); Dunbar (2000); Krigman,
Shaw, and Womack (2001); Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006)). For example, using
data on individual analyst job changes from 1988 to 1999, Clarke et al. document that when
an all-star analyst moves from one investment bank to another, the old bank loses equity
issuance market share while the new bank gains market share. Dunbar finds that analyst
reputation, as measured by Institutional Investor rankings, is an important determinant
of the IPO market share of investment banks that act as book managers. Krigman et al.
study the underwriter choice of issuers completing secondary equity offerings for the first
time. Their empirical evidence and survey results suggest that both dissatisfaction with the
12

quality of analyst coverage provided by the IPO underwriter and strong analyst reputation
at the secondary offering underwriter are driving factors in an issuer’s decision to switch to
a new underwriter. Also, in studying underwriter choice for follow-on offerings, Ljungqvist
et al. find that having an all-star analyst increases the likelihood of a bank being chosen as
the lead underwriter in the all-star analyst’s industry.
The Departure Hypothesis predicts a negative difference-in-differences coefficient ( ) on
the interaction term in equation (1). That is, the bank-industries that had at least one allstar analyst in the pre-Settlement period on average suffered losses in their equity issuance
market shares in the post-Settlement period, relative to bank-industries that had zero all-star
analysts in the pre-Settlement period.
Furthermore, the Departure Hypothesis predicts a stronger treatment effect (i.e., a more
negative difference-in-differences coefficient) for the bank-industries whose all-star analysts were on average of higher quality than for the bank-industries whose all-star analysts
were of lower quality. That is, the more talented an all-star analyst, the higher were her
bank’s losses in its equity issuance market share in the analyst’s industry after the analyst’s
departure.
2.2.2. Optimism Hypothesis
Since all-star analysts were on average more involved in their banks’ investment banking
activities than their unranked peers prior to the Global Settlement, one might expect all-star
analysts to have been under more intense pressure to attract investment banking business
and thus subject to more severe conflicts of interest. This argument is backed by at least
two prominent examples: Multi-year all-star analysts Jack Grubman from Citigroup and
Henry Blodget from Merrill Lynch, both commanding annual salaries of over $10 million
prior to the Global Settlement, were charged with producing fraudulent research reports
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and barred from the securities industry for life.
The Optimism Hypothesis assumes that all-star analysts were more likely to be optimistically biased than non-all-star analysts in the pre-Settlement period. This hypothesis states
that, as research analysts became less likely to publish overly optimistic research coverage in the post-Settlement period, the bank-industries that had all-star analysts in the
pre-Settlement period on average suffered losses in their equity issuance market shares in
the post-Settlement period, relative to bank-industries that had no all-star analysts in the
pre-Settlement period.
Like the Departure Hypothesis, the Optimism Hypothesis predicts a negative differencein-differences coefficient in equation (1). Unlike the Departure Hypothesis, however, the
Optimism Hypothesis is not contingent upon the post-Settlement departure of all-star analysts from the sell side.
The Optimism Hypothesis has a second prediction: The treatment effect should be stronger
(i.e., the difference-in-differences coefficient more negative) for the bank-industries whose
all-star analysts were on average more optimistically biased than for the bank-industries
whose all-star analysts were less optimistically biased. That is, the more optimistically
biased an all-star analyst, the higher were her bank’s losses in its equity issuance market
share in the analyst’s industry in the post-Settlement period.
The existing literature provides little evidence that all-star analysts are more optimistically
biased than non-all-star analysts. On the contrary, the opposite appears to be true. For
example, compared to non-all-star analysts, all-star analysts have been found to be on average less positively biased and less aggressive in issuing stock upgrade recommendations;
during market peaks, all-star analysts working at top-tier banks have become more accurate relative to their non-all-star colleagues (e.g., Fang and Yasuda (2009); Ljungqvist,
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Marston, and Wilhelm (2006)). These results are consistent with personal reputation acting as an effective discipline mechanism against conflicts of interest. Lastly, the literature
provides little evidence that issuing optimistic stock recommendations helps an investment
bank win underwriting mandates (e.g., Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2007); Ljungqvist,
Marston, and Wilhelm (2006)).
2.2.3. Changing Risk Hypothesis
Rock (1986) develops a model in which IPO shares are underpriced to compensate uninformed investors for their information disadvantage. When issues are underpriced, both
informed and uninformed investors submit orders. However, when issues are overpriced,
only uninformed investors submit orders. This leads to the outcome that when uninformed
investors are allocated shares in an IPO, too often the shares are overpriced. In equilibrium, underpricing arises to induce uninformed investors to participate in the market. Ritter
(1984) interprets equilibrium underpricing as compensating uninformed investors for the
cost of becoming informed – performing securities analysis and so on. Ritter argues that the
greater the fundamental uncertainty about an issue, the greater the required compensation.
In particular, high-risk offerings should be underpriced more than low-risk offerings. Here,
“risk” is not beta-type risk, but reflects technological or valuation uncertainty. Empirical
evidence from the same paper supports this argument.
During equity offerings, research analysts could play an important role of certifying to potential investors that the shares being issued are appropriately priced (e.g., Dunbar (2000)).
The departure of an all-star analyst, however, would deprive a bank’s potential investors of
the analyst’s securities analysis. Without access to high-quality research from the bank, investors would be forced to devote resources to either performing the analysis themselves or
obtaining research from a third party. As a form of compensation, investors could demand
underpricing from the bank in the form of a lower offer price. More underpricing would be
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demanded for issuances that were intrinsically more difficult to value, since more resources
would be required to perform high-quality analysis on such issuances.
Therefore, the Changing Risk Hypothesis predicts a positive difference-in-differences coefficient on the interaction term in equation (1). More importantly, the treatment effect
should be stronger (i.e., the difference-in-differences coefficient more positive) for highvaluation-risk issuances than for low-valuation-risk issuances. That is, the difference in
average underpricing between the treatment group and the control group should widen in
the post-Settlement period, and it should widen more for issuances with higher valuation
risk.
2.2.4. Analyst Lust Hypothesis
The Analyst Lust Hypothesis assumes that underwriters always want to underprice equity
issuances. Since equity issuers value high-quality analyst coverage, they are willing to tolerate underpricing as a form of compensation to the underwriter for providing high-quality
analyst coverage (e.g., Cliff and Denis (2004); Loughran and Ritter (2004)). Previous studies have shown that equity issuers put high value on securing high-quality research coverage (e.g., Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2007); Dunbar (2000); Krigman, Shaw, and
Womack (2001); Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006)). Furthermore, Cliff and Denis
(2004) argue that equity issuers purchase analyst coverage with underpricing, by showing
that first-day returns are positively related to the presence of an all-star analyst on the research staff of the lead underwriter, and to the quality of analyst coverage provided by the
lead underwriter, controlling for endogeneity between underpricing and analyst coverage.
When an all-star analyst departs from a bank, the bank’s equity-issuing clients should
become less willing to tolerate underpricing, bringing underpricing down from its preSettlement level. To the extent that the average quality of research analysts in the con-
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trol group bank-industries improved relative to that of research analysts in the treatment
group bank-industries, average underpricing for the control group should rise from its preSettlement level.
Therefore, the Analyst Lust Hypothesis predicts a negative difference-in-differences coefficient on the interaction term in equation (1). That is, the difference in average underpricing
between the treatment group and the control group should narrow in the post-Settlement
period.
Additionally, the treatment effect could be stronger (i.e., the difference-in-differences coefficient more negative) for issuances that are intrinsically more difficult to value, to the
extent that high-valuation-risk issuers put more value on research coverage by reputable
analysts, due to the analysts’ certification role to uninformed investors prior to an issuance
or their continuing supply of securities analysis to such investors in the aftermarket. That is,
the difference in average underpricing between the treatment group and the control group
could narrow more for issuances with higher valuation risk.
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Table 1: Global Research Analyst Settlement, and Treatment Group
Column A lists the twelve investment banks involved in the Global Settlement. The settlement agreement reached in April 2003 originally included ten investment banks operating
in the US. The list expanded to twelve when Deutsche Bank and Thomas Weisel joined the
settlement in August 2004. A bank-industry belongs in the treatment group if at least one
of its research analysts was named an all-star by Institutional Investor in any year during
1998-2001 and stayed with the bank until the end of 2001. Industries are classified using
GICS codes. Each all-star analyst is first assigned to the GICS industry in which she issued
the largest fraction of earnings forecasts during 1998-2001. GICS classifications are then
checked against industry classifications assigned by Institutional Investor, and changes are
made whenever inconsistencies occur. For each investment bank, column B lists the number of industries in the treatment group, and column C lists the number of industry-year
observations in my difference-in-differences specification. Sample period is 1998-2007,
with event years 2002 and 2003 excluded from this sample.
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Investment Bank

No. of Industries
with All-Stars

Industry-Year
Observations

Bear Stearns
Citigroup
Credit Suisse
Deutsche Bank
Goldman Sachs
J.P. Morgan
Lehman Brothers
Merrill Lynch
Morgan Stanley
Piper Jaffray
Thomas Weisel
UBS

30
47
48
18
44
19
30
44
44
0
1
16

199
298
317
100
299
133
183
298
277
0
7
99

Total

341

2210 (44.50%)
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
3.1. Data
3.1.1. All-Star Analysts
An analyst is an “all-star” in a given year if the analyst is named to the All-America Research Team by the Institutional Investor magazine in that year. Every year the magazine
surveys a large number of consumers of sell-side research, including portfolio managers,
investment officers, and buy-side analysts, who are asked to evaluate the quality of sell-side
research analysts. Important performance metrics include accuracy of earnings estimates,
quality of stock picking, quality of written reports, timeliness of communications with investors, and responsiveness to investor requests. Analyst rankings – including first, second,
and third position, and runners-up – are compiled based on survey results and published in
the October issue.
I use the GICS industry classification, following previous studies, since it has been shown
that partitions on the basis of GICS codes provide a good proxy for how analysts specialize
by industry (Boni and Womack (2006); Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2007)). I obtain
GICS industry codes from Compustat. To assign an all-star analyst to a GICS industry,
I first assign the analyst to her “primary” GICS industry, in which the analyst issued the
largest fraction of her earnings forecasts during 1998-2001. I then check this GICS industry
assignment against the Institutional Investor magazine’s industry assignment, and make
changes whenever inconsistencies occur. For example, I update the analyst’s primary GICS
industry code with a different GICS industry code if the analyst is named an all-star in an
industry other than her primary industry. If the analyst is named an all-star in more than
one industry, I assign additional GICS industry codes to the analyst.
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There were a total of 462 all-star analysts during the period of 1998-2001. The final treatment group retains 382 all-star analysts after dropping: (1) all-star analysts who did not
work for a sanctioned bank during 1998-2001; (2) all-star analysts who moved to different
sell-side firms during 1998-2001 and were never named all-stars at their new firms during
1998-2001; and (3) all-star analysts who left the sell side during 1998-2001.4 I identify
all-star analyst departures from the sell-side industry in the post-Settlement period using
I/B/E/S and Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research. For every year up to 2008, Nelson’s published comprehensive information on the sell-side investment research industry,
including information on research firms, their executives, and all research analysts active
in that year. I first identify the last year in which an analyst’s earnings estimates appear
in I/B/E/S. I then check this information against the Analyst Registry in Nelson’s – which
lists, for every year, the names and employers of all active sell-side analysts – to ensure
that the analyst did indeed leave the sell-side industry. If an analyst disappears from the
Nelson’s registry but appears as an executive at the same firm under Executives by Job
Function, I do not consider that analyst as having departed from the sell-side industry.
3.1.2. Market Share
I obtain data on equity issuances, including gross proceeds, offer price, the identities of
the lead or co-lead managers, and the number of lead or co-lead managers, from Thomson
Reuters’s SDC database. I drop ADRs, units, partnerships, and stocks not listed on the
NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX. I also drop categories with missing GICS industry codes,
including funds, investment trusts, and non-operating establishments. I calculate an investment bank’s industry market share in a given year as the gross proceeds raised by the
investment bank in that industry through deals in which the investment bank acted as a
4

All-star analysts who were fired are excluded from my analysis. Prominent examples include Jack Grubman from Citigroup and Henry Blodget from Merrill Lynch, who, under the terms of the Global Settlement,
were barred from the securities industry for life.
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lead or co-lead manager, divided by the total gross proceeds of all deals completed in that
industry in that year. Market share is computed both for IPO underwritings and for IPO
and follow-on underwritings combined.
If an investment bank acquired or merged with another investment bank at any time during
my sample period, I add the market share of the acquired bank to that of the acquirer for the
period prior to the acquisition or merger, in order to account for the effect of consolidation.
For example, PaineWebber was acquired by UBS in 2000. I therefore compute the market
share of UBS in 1998, 1999, and 2000 as the sum of the market share of UBS and that of
PaineWebber. Additionally, if a treatment bank-industry had an all-star starting from, but
not before, for example, 2000, I include only market share observations starting from, but
not before, 2000 in my regression analysis.
3.1.3. Underpricing and Valuation Risk Measures
I obtain stock prices from CRSP. I calculate the underpricing of an equity issuance as its
first-day return, or the percentage change from the offer price to the first-day closing price.
To obtain underpricing at the bank-industry-year level, I compute the weighted average
underpricing of equity issuances underwritten by a bank in an industry in a year. The
higher the number of lead or co-lead managers in an issuance, the lower is the weight given
to the underpricing of that issuance, for the following reason. Both the Changing Risk
Hypothesis and the Analyst Lust Hypothesis posit that the degree of underpricing of an
issuance is affected by the quality of the research analysts at the underwriter. Since an
issuance sometimes involves multiple lead or co-lead managers, I assume that the higher
the number of lead or co-lead managers there are in a deal, the less important is the analyst
quality at each underwriter in determining the level of underpricing of the deal.
I use two measures of valuation risk of an equity issuance. The first measure is whether
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an issuer belongs in a high-technology industry, assuming that tech issuances are more
difficult to value. In my triple-difference specification, this measure is represented by an
indicator that equals 1 for observations that belong in a tech industry, and 0 otherwise.5
The second measure is issuer age, assuming that issuances from younger issuers are more
difficult to value due to the lack of an operating history. I measure the age of an issuer at
its public offering as the difference between the issuer’s founding year, obtained from Jay
Ritter’s website, and the year of the public offering.6 In my triple-difference specification,
this measure is represented by a continuous variable that equals the average issuer age of
issuances underwritten by a bank in an industry in a year.
3.1.4. Analyst Quality Proxies
I obtain earnings forecasts and stock recommendations from I/B/E/S. I measure the quality of an analyst along five dimensions: earnings forecast accuracy, frequency of forecast
revisions, forecast timeliness, earnings forecast optimism, and abnormal recommendation
levels. Since earnings estimates, timeliness, and responsiveness are among the factors that
determine an analyst’s ranking by Institutional Investor, I use the first three proxies – earnings forecast accuracy, frequency of forecast revisions, and forecast timeliness – to measure
the reputation of an analyst. I use earnings forecast optimism and abnormal recommendation levels to proxy for the bias of an analyst.
Since measures of forecast accuracy and optimism are issuer- and industry-dependent,
comparing the forecast error of one analyst to that of another, for example, could be prob5

Tech industries are defined as those in GICS codes 254010 (media), 255020 (internet and catalog retail),
351010 (health care equipment and supplies), 351030 (health care technology), 352030 (life science tools and
services), 451010 (internet software and services), 451020 (IT services), 451030 (software), 452010 (communications equipment), 452020 (computers and peripherals), 452030 (electronic equipment, instruments and
components industry), 453010 (semiconductors and semiconductor equipment), 501010 (diversified telecommunication services), and 501020 (wireless telecommunication services).
6
I obtain data on founding years from this website: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/
ritter/FoundingDates.htm.
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lematic if some issuing firms are more difficult to value than others. For this reason, I
follow previous papers and use a scoring methodology to compute performance scores
based analysts’ relative performance (e.g., Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2007); Hong
and Kubik (2003); Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000); Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei,
and Yan (2007)).
Forecast Accuracy: I compute analyst k’s forecast error for firm s and year t as the absolute
difference between the analyst’s then-most recent forecast of annual earnings per share
issued before the fiscal year-end of firm s in year t, and the realized earnings per share of
firm s in year t. I then rank all analysts who covered firm s in year t based on their forecast
errors, assigning the most accurate analyst a rank of one. Next, to obtain the forecast
accuracy score of analyst k for firm s in year t, I scale each rank by the number of analysts
who covered firm s in year t, as follows:

Forecast Accuracy Scorek;s;t = 100

Rankk;s;t 1
Number of Analystss;t

1

100

(3)

Last, I compute an analyst’s pre-Settlement forecast accuracy score by averaging the analyst’s forecast accuracy scores for 1998-2001. I label this measure Proxy I, which is similar
to Relative Forecast Accuracy constructed in Hong and Kubik (2003), among others. Following Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2007), I also compute an alternative measure,
Proxy II, by counting the proportion of the analyst’s scores for 1998-2001 that are 50 or
higher. Proxy I ranges from 0 for the least accurate analyst to 100 for the most accurate
analyst. Proxy II ranges from 0 for the least accurate analyst to 1 for the most accurate
analyst.
Coverage Frequency: I compute analyst k’s coverage frequency score for firm s in year t
by ranking all analysts who covered firm s in year t, based on the number of times they
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revised their annual earnings estimates for firm s in year t, and scaling the ranks using
equation (3). I then compute Proxy I and Proxy II for each analyst in a similar way to how
I compute Forecast Accuracy. Proxy I ranges from 0 for the least frequent forecaster to 100
for the most frequent forecaster. Proxy II ranges from 0 for the least frequent forecaster to
1 for the most frequent forecaster. The use of this measure is motivated by the finding in
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) that dissatisfaction with the frequency of coverage is
a major reason for which follow-on offering issuers switch underwriters.
Coverage Timeliness: I compute analyst k’s coverage timeliness score for firm s in year
t by ranking all analysts who covered firm s in year t, based on how quickly they issued
their first annual earnings estimates for firm s in year t after the release of the previous
year’s earnings. As for previous measures, I compute Proxy I and Proxy II such that Proxy
I ranges from 0 for the least timely analyst to 100 for the most timely analyst, and Proxy
II ranges from 0 for the least timely analyst to 1 for the most timely analyst. I include this
measure since it has been argued that an analyst who issues the first annual forecast is less
likely to be herding with other analysts, and that analysts who exhibit herd behavior have
lower ability (e.g., Clement and Tse (2005); Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000)).
Forecast Optimism: I compute analyst k’s forecast optimism bias for firm s in year t by
subtracting the consensus (average) forecast made by all other analysts covering firm s
in year t from analyst k’s forecast. I then compute analyst k’s forecast optimism score
for firm s in year t by ranking all analysts who covered firm s in year t, based on their
forecast optimism biases for firm s in year t. Following the methodology described above,
I compute Proxy I and Proxy II such that Proxy I ranges from 0 for the least optimistically
biased analyst to 100 for the most optimistically biased analyst, and Proxy II ranges from
0 for the least optimistically biased analyst to 1 for the most optimistically biased analyst.
Abnormal Recommendation Level: I compute analyst k’s abnormal recommendation level
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for firm s in year t by subtracting the consensus (average) recommendation level made by
all other analysts covering firm s in year t from analyst k’s recommendation level. I then
compute analyst k’s abnormal recommendation score for firm s in year t by ranking all
analysts who covered firm s in year t, based on their abnormal recommendation levels for
firm s in year t. As for previous measures, I compute Proxy I and Proxy II such that Proxy
I ranges from 0 for the least optimistically biased analyst to 100 for the most optimistically
biased analyst, and Proxy II ranges from 0 for the least optimistically biased analyst to 1
for the most optimistically biased analyst.
To assess the overall quality of an analyst, I also construct three composite measures using
the five measures described above. The above procedures result in two scores, Proxy I and
Proxy II, for each of the five measures, for each analyst who exists in I/B/E/S for 19982001. For each analyst k, I compute the composite measures as follows, separately for
Proxy I and for Proxy II:

Reputationk =

Forecast Accuracyk + Coverage Frequencyk + Coverage Timelinessk
3
(4)

Biask =

Forecast Optimismk + Abnormal Recommendation Levelk
2

[Reputation-Bias]k = Reputationk
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Biask

(5)

(6)

3.2. Summary Statistics
In Table 2 Panel A, I present summary statistics for two regression samples. In the first
sample, labeled IPOs & SEOs, I compute Market Share using IPO and follow-on underwritings combined. In the second sample, labeled IPOs Only, I compute Market Share using IPO underwritings alone. For each, I show the number of observations, mean, standard
deviation, minimum value, maximum value, and 25th/50th/75th/90th percentile values.
My regressions are at the bank-industry-year level. Whenever an industry has at least one
equity issuance in a given year, I assign each bank a Market Share value for that industryyear, including zeros for banks that have no underwritings in that industry-year. If an
industry has no equity issuances in a given year, I assign missing Market Share values to
all banks in that industry-year. There are fewer observations in the IPOs Only sample than
in the IPOs & SEOs sample because some industries have only follow-on offerings, but not
IPOs, in certain years.
There are fewer Underpricing observations than there are Market Share observations for
the following reason. For a bank-industry-year to have a non-missing Underpricing value,
it is necessary that the bank underwrites at least one equity issuance in that industry in
that year. On the other hand, a non-missing Market Share value for a bank-industry-year
only requires that the given industry, not necessarily the given bank, has at least one equity
issuance in that year. Additionally, values of Avg. Issuer Age are missing for some bankindustry-years due to the lack of information on the founding years of some issuers.
Lastly, No. of Deals in Industry-Year has a minimum value of 1 because I assign missing
values to Market Share for industry-years that have zero equity issuances. This number
increases to 3 at the 25th percentile for the IPOs & SEOs sample, and at the 50th percentile
for the IPOs Only sample. The low number of issuances in certain industry-years gives
27

rise to undesirable discontinuity in market shares across banks, with a few banks claiming
100% and the rest 0%. As an attempt to address this problem, I perform additional analysis
by limiting my sample to include only Market Share observations from industry-years that
have at least three equity issuances.
In Table 2 Panel B, I compare the treatment group bank-industries to the control group
bank-industries along a few observable dimensions, using data from the pre-Settlement period of 1998-2001. I organize the observables into two categories, namely, those associated
with the bank-industries’ equity research coverage, and those associated with their equity
underwriting. I show the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of each observable,
separately for the treatment group and for the control group. The last column reports the
p-value from a t-test comparing the mean of each observable between the two groups. I
obtain accounting variables from Compustat and market value of equity (i.e., stock price
times number of shares) from CRSP.
The two groups do not differ in the characteristics of the companies that they covered or
underwrote, based on the p-values associated with Tobin’s Q and the accounting variables,
namely, total assets, sales, leverage ratio, payout ratio, capital expenditures as a fraction
of total assets, and R&D expenses as a fraction of total assets. The treatment group bankindustries, however, tended to cover more companies and employ more analysts. That
is, all-star analysts tended to be from larger research departments. Each analyst from the
treatment group on average covered more companies, which is perhaps a reflection of the
all-star analysts’ capability and experience. Analysts from the treatment group (including
non-all-stars) were on average more senior than those from the control group, which is
perhaps unsurprising given that all-star analysts tend to be more senior than their unranked
peers. The treatment group bank-industries also underwrote more and larger equity issuances, consistent with my finding, discussed in the next section, that the treatment group
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had significantly higher average market share than the control group in the pre-Settlement
period. Even though these summary statistics suggest that my treatment group and control
group are different along a few observable dimensions – likely driven by the way I define
these two groups – I demonstrate in the next section that the “parallel trends” assumption
is satisfied. That is, the average market share of the treatment group and that of the control
group behaved similarly in the period leading up to the Global Settlement.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel A presents regression sample summary statistics. Sample period is 1998-2007, with
event years 2002 and 2003 excluded. The sample of equity issuances, including IPOs and
follow-on offerings (SEOs), excludes ADRs, units, partnerships, and stocks not listed on
NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX. Also excluded are categories with missing GICS codes, including funds, investment trusts, and non-operating establishments. Market Share is the
industry market share in a given year, calculated as the gross proceeds raised by an investment bank in a particular industry through deals in which the investment bank acts as a lead
or co-lead manager, divided by the total gross proceeds of all deals completed in that industry in that year. Post is an indicator that equals 1 for observations from 2004-2007, and 0 for
observations from 1998-2001. Treatment is an indicator that equals 1 for observations in
the treatment group, and 0 otherwise. No. of Deals in Industry-Year is the total number of
equity issuances in a given industry in a given year. Underpricing is the weighted average
underpricing of equity issuances underwritten by a bank in an industry in a year; the higher
the number of lead or co-lead managers in an issuance, the lower is the weight given to the
underpricing of that issuance. Underpricing of an issuance, or first-day return, is defined as
the percentage change from the offer price to the first-day closing price. Tech is an indicator
that equals 1 for observations that belong in a tech industry, and 0 otherwise. Avg. Issuer
Age is a continuous variable equal to the average issuer age of equity issuances underwritten by a bank in an industry in a year, where the age of an issuer is defined as the difference
between the issuer’s founding year and the year of the public offering. Panel B reports
ex ante characteristics calculated using data from 1998-2001, separately for the treatment
group and for the control group. Accounting variables under Equity Coverage are of companies that are covered by the treatment and control bank-industries. Accounting variables
under Equity Underwriting are of companies whose equity issuances are underwritten by
the treatment and control bank-industries. The last column reports p-values from t-tests
comparing the mean values between the treatment group and the control group. Standard
deviations are shown in parentheses.
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IPOs Only
Market Share
Post
Treatment
No. of Deals in
Industry-Year
Underpricing
Tech
Avg. Issuer Age

IPOs & SEOs
Market Share
Post
Treatment
No. of Deals in
Industry-Year
Underpricing
Tech
Avg. Issuer Age

0.0309
0.5477
0.4483
5.878
0.1446
0.4208
22.41

1105
1105
1050

0.05066
0.3281
24.88

2161
2161
1772

3792
3792
3792
3792

0.03956
0.5322
0.445
12.54

Mean

4966
4966
4966
4966

N

0.2674
0.4939
26.98

0.07237
0.4978
0.4974
9.556

0.1161
0.4696
25.29

0.08003
0.499
0.497
18.51

Std. Dev.

-0.1458
0
1

0
0
0
1

-0.1
0
1

0
0
0
1

Min

0.003955
0
6

0
0
0
2

0.002336
0
8

0
0
0
3

p25

0.05556
0
11

0
1
0
3

0.0133
0
15

0
1
0
7

p50

Panel A. Regression Sample Summary Statistics

0.18
1
26

0.01045
1
1
7

0.045
1
31

0.04508
1
1
14

p75

0.3953
1
59.75

0.1249
1
1
12

0.1378
1
62

0.1298
1
1
27

p90

1.643
1
125

0.375
1
1
159

0.7083
1
109

0.45
1
1
207

Max
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2.617 (2.769)
4550 (9170)
2080 (4120)
0.3495 (0.2944)
0.3703 (0.7463)
0.1141 (0.2117)
0.1621 (0.2221)
2.731 (3.637)
202.1 (264.9)

Equity Underwriting
Tobin’s Q
Assets (Millions)
Sales (Millions)
Leverage Ratio
Payout Ratio
Capex/Assets
R&D/Assets
No. of Equity Issuances Underwritten
Mean Proceeds (Millions)

2.776 (2.32)
4750 (9530)
2320 (4180)
0.3234 (0.2316)
0.296 (0.5096)
0.1152 (0.09579)
0.1215 (0.1693)
5.684 (7.277)
254.8 (293.9)

1.914 (1.311)
12300 (25400)
5570 (8030)
0.4007 (0.1849)
0.3355 (0.3828)
0.07463 (0.04224)
0.05167 (0.06804)
10.11 (9.666)
3.333 (2.413)
2.895 (1.997)
5.49 (3.188)

(2)
Control Group

Equity Coverage
Tobin’s Q
1.961 (1.092)
Assets (Millions)
12800 (21400)
Sales (Millions)
6080 (6300)
Leverage Ratio
0.3895 (0.1581)
Payout Ratio
0.3084 (0.2576)
Capex/Assets
0.07488 (0.04266)
R&D/Assets
0.05261 (0.06284)
No. of Companies Covered (per Year)
22.65 (15.66)
No. of Analysts Employed (per Year)
5.696 (3.821)
No. of Companies Covered per Analyst (per Year)
3.801 (1.856)
Seniority of Analysts
5.898 (2.486)

(1)
Treatment Group

Panel B. Ex Ante Characteristics

0.5448
0.834
0.5769
0.3423
0.3258
0.9587
0.2032
0.000
0.0572

0.5944
0.7623
0.3341
0.3748
0.2617
0.9366
0.8603
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.052

(3)
p-value

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
4.1. Impact of Global Settlement on Investment Banking Deal Flow
4.1.1. Main Results
Both the Departure Hypothesis and the Optimism Hypothesis predict that the bank-industries
that had at least one all-star analyst in the pre-Settlement period would suffer losses in
their equity issuance market shares in the post-Settlement period, relative to the bankindustries that had no all-star analysts in the pre-Settlement period. Table 3 Panel A
presents difference-in-differences results that are consistent with these predictions. The
dependent variable is the industry market share of a bank in a year. Columns (1) and (2)
present full-sample results using market share of IPO and follow-on underwritings combined, and market share of IPO underwritings alone, respectively. Similarly, columns (3)
and (4) present subsample results using only market share observations that are computed
from industry-years with at least three equity issuances in total. The regression samples in
this panel exclude the event years 2002 and 2003.
All difference-in-differences coefficients are negative and statistically significant. Fullsample results show that the relative losses suffered by the treatment bank-industries average 2.96% in market share for IPO and follow-on underwritings combined, and 3.79% in
market share for IPO underwritings alone, equivalent to relative losses of about $15 million
and $9 million per treatment bank-industry, respectively, in total underwriting fees between
2004 and 2007. For all treatment bank-industries, relative losses in total underwriting fees
between 2004 and 2007 amount to about $5.14 billion and $2.72 billion, respectively, for
IPO and follow-on underwritings combined and for IPO underwritings alone. Subsample results are qualitatively similar with difference-in-differences coefficients of slightly
33

smaller magnitudes: The relative losses suffered by the treatment bank-industries average 2.48% in market share for IPO and follow-on underwritings combined, and 2.94% in
market share for IPO underwritings alone, equivalent to relative losses of about $13 million and $7 million per treatment bank-industry, respectively, in total underwriting fees
between 2004 and 2007. For all treatment bank-industries, subsample results show that
relative losses in total underwriting fees between 2004 and 2007 amount to about $4.31
billion and $2.11 billion, respectively, for IPO and follow-on underwritings combined and
for IPO underwritings alone.7
Both full-sample and subsample results indicate that the treatment bank-industries’ relative
market share losses were more severe for IPO underwritings than for IPO and follow-on
underwritings combined. One explanation for this result is that secondary offering issuers,
having established business relationships with underwriters in previous issuances, have the
tendency to rehire those underwriters. The stickiness of underwriting relationships could
cause the quality of analyst coverage to become a weaker (albeit still important – see, e.g.,
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001)) determinant in the underwriter choice for secondary
offering issuers. Unreported results show a statistically significant, but weaker, treatment
effect for follow-on underwritings alone than for both IPO underwritings alone and IPO
and follow-on underwritings combined.
The pre-Settlement market share of the treatment bank-industries is on average higher than
that of the control bank-industries, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on Treatment. The difference ranges from 1.68% to 2.06% for IPO and
follow-on underwritings combined, which is economically significant given the average
pre-Settlement market share of 4.54% for the treatment bank-industries (not reported). The
7

I compute underwriting fees using an average gross spread of 5.01% of total proceeds for IPO and followon underwritings combined, and an average gross spread of 6.66% of total proceeds for IPO underwritings
alone. I compute these percentages using equity issuance data from between 2004 and 2007.
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difference ranges from 0.75% to 0.93% for IPO underwritings alone, which is economically significant given the average pre-Settlement market share of 2.22% for the treatment
bank-industries (not reported).
The sum (“Sum”) of the coefficient of Treatment and the difference-in-differences coefficient represents the difference in average market share between the treatment group and the
control group in the post-Settlement period. Wald tests (“F Statistic, Wald Test” and “TwoSided p-value”) indicate that this sum is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level
or lower in all four regressions. In other words, unlike in the pre-Settlement period, in the
post-Settlement period, the average market share of the treatment bank-industries became
statistically significantly lower than that of the control bank-industries, making the relative
market share losses of the treatment bank-industries economically significant.
Table 3 Panel B presents the coefficient trend. The regression samples in this panel include
the event years 2002 and 2003. Consistent with a causal interpretation of the above results,
the coefficient on Treatment*GS(-1) is statistically insignificant, but the coefficients on
Treatment*GS(+1) and Treatment*GS(2+) are statistically negative. In other words, the
effect of the Global Settlement appears only after the regulation is announced and not
before.
Figure 1 Panel A plots the average market share of IPO and follow-on underwritings combined, separately for the treatment bank-industries and for the control bank-industries, for
each year from 1998 to 2007. Figure 1 Panel B plots the coefficient trend, or the difference
in average market share between the treatment group and the control group, for four years
before and four years after the Global Settlement, relative to the event years. Figure 2
Panels A and B plot the same graphs but for the market share of IPO underwritings alone.
These figures demonstrate that the average market shares of the treatment bank-industries
and of the control bank-industries behaved similarly, or exhibit “parallel trends,” prior to
35

the Global Settlement. The difference in average market share between these two groups
does not exhibit a downward trend prior to the Global Settlement; it declines only after the
regulation is announced.
4.1.2. Placebo Results
To further examine whether the patterns observed above are a result of the Global Settlement, I perform an identical analysis using a different sample period, from 1990 to 1999. I
define 1994 and 1995 to be the “event years,” 1990-1993 to be the “pre-event years,” and
1996-1999 to be the “post-event years.” The “treatment group” contains sixteen investment
banks that I identify to be the then-largest investment banks in the United States, based on
both the number of equity issuances underwritten and the equity issuance market share of
each bank during 1990-1993. Table 4 Panel A presents the treatment group used in my
placebo test. Table 4 Panel B presents the results. All difference-in-differences coefficients
are statistically insignificant, consistent with the patterns described in the previous section
being specific to the period of the Global Settlement and not a recurring phenomenon.
4.1.3. All-Star Analyst Departures from Sell Side
This section documents post-Settlement departures of all-star analysts from the sell side.
There are a total of 382 all-star analysts in my analysis, whom I divide into three categories,
as shown in Table 5 Panel A: (1) Full Departure, or all-star analysts who left the sell side
from their 2001-employer during 2002-2007; (2) Partial Departure, or all-star analysts who
left their 2001-employer to join another sell-side securities firm during 2002-2007, regardless of whether they eventually left the sell side; and (3) No Departure, or all-star analysts
who stayed at their 2001-employer throughout the period of 2002-2007. Panel A shows
that a total of 217 all-star analysts, or 56.81%, departed from the sell-side research industry
from their 2001-employer during 2002-2007, as indicated under Full Departure.

36

Next, to provide a description of my sample of treatment bank-industries in terms of their
all-star analyst departure statuses, I translate the three all-star analyst categories from Panel
A into three bank-industry categories, as shown in Table 5 Panel B: (1) Full Departure, or
bank-industries that had at least one all-star analyst who left the sell side from their 2001employer during 2002-2007; (2) Partial Departure, or bank-industries that had at least one
all-star analyst who left their 2001-employer to join another sell-side securities firm during
2002-2007, but no all-star analysts who left the sell side altogether; and (3) No Departure,
or bank-industries whose all-star analysts stayed at their 2001-employer throughout the
period of 2002-2007. Panel B shows that a total of 233 bank-industries, or 68.33% of the
treatment bank-industries, contained at least one all-star analyst who departed from the
sell-side research industry from their 2001-employer during 2002-2007, as indicated under
Full Departure. The number of bank-industries under Full Departure in Panel B is higher
than the number of all-star analysts under Full Departure in Panel A since one analyst
could be named an all-star in multiple industries.
Lastly, Table 5 Panel C reports the number of post-Settlement departures of all-star analysts
from the sell side (see Panel A, Full Departure) by year from 2002 to 2007. Panel C shows
that among the all-star analyst departures from the sell side during 2002-2007, 67.74%
occurred during 2002-2004, which are the years during which the Global Settlement and the
SRO regulations were announced, plus the year immediately after. Over 20% of departures
occurred in each of 2002, 2003, and 2004, and about 11% occurred in each of 2005, 2006,
and 2007. These results are consistent with all-star analysts departing from the sell side in
response to the Global Settlement and the SRO regulations.
4.1.4. Repeat All-Stars
The Departure Hypothesis predicts a stronger treatment effect for the bank-industries whose
all-star analysts were on average of higher quality than for the bank-industries whose all37

star analysts were of lower quality. This section tests this hypothesis by using the number
of times for which an analyst was named an all-star as a proxy for the analyst’s quality. For
each treatment bank-industry, I compute the average number of times for which its all-star
analysts were named all-stars during 1998-2001. Since analysts are ranked by Institutional
Investor annually, an analyst could be named an all-star for a maximum of four times during this period. I then divide the treatment bank-industries into two groups: Treatment
group 1 contains bank-industries whose all-star analysts were named all-stars for an average of one to two times during 1998-2001, and treatment group 2 contains bank-industries
whose all-star analysts were named all-stars for an average of three to four times during
1998-2001.
Table 6 Panel A shows that the difference-in-differences coefficient is more negative for
treatment group 2 than for treatment group 1, consistent with bank-industries with higherquality all-star analysts suffering more post-Settlement losses in their equity issuance market shares than bank-industries with lower-quality all-star analysts. The difference between
the two difference-in-differences coefficients (“Difference (1-2)”), however, is not statistically significant based on Wald tests (“F Statistic, Wald Test” and “Two-Sided p-value”).
In order to better distinguish multi-year all-stars, or “superstars,” from the rest of the allstars, I extend my analyst rankings data back to 1994 in order to compute the number of
times for which an analyst was named an all-star during the eight-year period from 1994
to 2001. I then divide the treatment bank-industries into four groups: Treatment group
1 contains bank-industries whose all-star analysts were named all-stars for an average of
one to two times during 1994-2001, treatment group 2 contains bank-industries whose allstar analysts were named all-stars for an average of three to four times during 1994-2001,
treatment group 3 contains bank-industries whose all-star analysts were named all-stars for
an average of five to six times during 1994-2001, and treatment group 4 contains bank-
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industries whose all-star analysts were named all-stars for an average of seven to eight
times during 1994-2001.
Table 6 Panel B shows that the difference-in-differences coefficients increase in magnitude
(i.e., become increasingly negative) from treatment group 1 to treatment group 4 in all
four regressions, and the increase is monotonic for IPO underwritings. The difference
between the difference-in-differences coefficient of treatment group 1 and that of treatment
group 4 (“Difference (1-4)”), however, is not statistically significant based on Wald tests
(“F Statistic, Wald Test” and “Two-Sided p-value”). Nevertheless, as in Panel A, the relative
strength of treatment effects across the treatment groups in Panel B shows support for the
Departure Hypothesis, which predicts that the more talented an all-star analyst, the higher
is her bank’s losses in its equity issuance market share in the analyst’s industry after the
analyst’s departure.
4.1.5. Analyst Quality
The Departure Hypothesis predicts a stronger treatment effect for the bank-industries whose
all-star analysts were on average of higher quality than for the bank-industries whose allstar analysts were of lower quality. The Optimism Hypothesis predicts a stronger treatment
effect for the bank-industries whose all-star analysts were on average more optimistically
biased than for the bank-industries whose all-star analysts were less optimistically biased.
This section tests these predictions using five measures of analyst quality constructed based
on analyst behavior – namely, forecast accuracy, coverage frequency, coverage timeliness,
forecast optimism, and abnormal recommendation levels – and three composite measures
– namely, Reputation, Bias, and Reputation-Bias – constructed using these five measures.
I first present descriptive statistics on analyst quality in Table 7. I then report regression
results in Table 8 and Table 9.
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For each sell-side analyst that exists in I/B/E/S for 1998-2001, I compute a forecast accuracy score for each firm in each year using the scoring methodology described in Section
3.1.4. I then compute the analyst’s pre-Settlement Forecast Accuracy score by averaging
the analyst’s scores for 1998-2001 (Proxy I), or by counting the proportion of the analyst’s
scores for 1998-2001 that are 50 or higher (Proxy II). Proxy I ranges from 0 to 100, and
Proxy II ranges from 0 to 1. I compute Coverage Frequency, Coverage Timeliness, Forecast
Optimism, and Abnormal Recommendation Levels in a similar way. I compute Reputation
by averaging Forecast Accuracy, Coverage Frequency, and Coverage Timeliness, Bias by
averaging Forecast Optimism and Abnormal Recommendation Levels, and Reputation-Bias
by subtracting Bias from Reputation. Last, for each measure I rank the scores of all analysts
to obtain a percentile for each analyst.
Table 7 Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the percentiles of all-star analysts, separately for Proxy I and for Proxy II. For Forecast Accuracy, Coverage Frequency, Coverage
Timeliness, and Reputation, both the average percentile of all-stars and the percentage of
all-stars with a percentile equal to or above 50 are consistently higher, and in most cases
much higher, than 50. For Forecast Optimism, Abnormal Recommendation Levels, and
Bias, these statistics are consistently below 50. Lastly, for Reputation-Bias, which measures the overall quality of an analyst, the statistics are again higher than 50. Consistent
with existing studies in the literature, these statistics suggest that, compared to non-all-star
analysts, all-star analysts are on average more accurate in their earnings forecasts, provide more frequent and timely coverage, and are less optimistically biased in their earnings
forecasts and stock recommendations.
Table 7 Panel B compares average analyst quality between the treatment bank-industries
and the control bank-industries. For each composite measure, I report the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses), separately for the treatment group and for the control group.
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The third column reports the difference in the mean value between the two groups, and
the last column reports the p-value from a t-test comparing mean values between the two
groups. The results show that the average Reputation score is statistically significantly
more positive, the average Bias score statistically significantly more negative, and the average Reputation-Bias score again statistically significantly more positive, for the treatment
group than for the control group. These results suggest that, compared to analysts at the
control bank-industries, analysts at the treatment bank-industries are on average less optimistically biased and are of higher overall quality. This finding is unsurprising given that
all-star analysts are present only in the treatment group and not in the control group, and
that all-star analysts exhibit superior performance compared to their unranked peers, as
shown in Panel A.
Table 8 presents regression results for each of the five analyst quality measures, using
Proxy I.8 Low Accuracy is an indicator that equals 1 if the average Forecast Accuracy
percentile of all-star analysts in a given bank-industry is below 50, and 0 otherwise. High
Accuracy is an indicator that equals 1 if the average Forecast Accuracy percentile of all-star
analysts in a given bank-industry is 50 or above, and 0 otherwise. Low Frequency and High
Frequency, Low Timeliness and High Timeliness, Low Optimism and High Optimism, and
Low Recommendation and High Recommendation are constructed in similar ways. Panel
A presents regression results for IPO and follow-on underwritings combined, and Panel B
presents regression results for IPO underwritings alone.
The relative magnitudes of the difference-in-differences coefficients show that the treatment effect is stronger for bank-industries whose all-star analysts were on average more
accurate in their earnings forecasts, provided more frequent coverage, and were less opti8

Unreported results using Proxy II are qualitatively similar. Unreported results using subsamples that
include only market share observations from industry-years with at least three equity issuances are also qualitatively similar.

41

mistically biased in their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. Although the difference in treatment effect between the “low quality” group and the “high quality” group is
statistically insignificant for IPO and follow-on underwritings combined, it is statistically
significant for IPO underwritings alone, based on Wald tests (“F Statistic, Wald Test” and
“Two-Sided p-value”).
There is, however, no evidence that the treatment effect is stronger for bank-industries
whose all-star analysts were on average more timely in their coverage. It is likely that
coverage timeliness is considered a valuable quality by issuers only to the extent that it is
correlated with superior forecast ability and frequent coverage. To simultaneously account
for different aspects of an analyst’s quality, I examine composite quality measures in Table
9.
Table 9 presents regression results for each of the three composite measures using Proxy
I, separately for IPO and follow-on underwritings combined, and for IPO underwritings
alone.9 The “low quality” and “high quality” indicators are constructed in a similar way as
in Table 8. The results show that the treatment effect is stronger for bank-industries whose
all-star analysts on average have higher Reputation scores, lower Bias scores, and higher
Reputation-Bias scores. As in Table 8, although the difference in treatment effect between
the “low quality” group and the “high quality” group is statistically insignificant for IPO
and follow-on underwritings combined, it is statistically significant for IPO underwritings
alone based on Wald tests (“F Statistic, Wald Test” and “Two-Sided p-value”).
Overall, the results in Table 8 and Table 9 are consistent with the Departure Hypothesis:
The higher the average quality of the all-star analysts in a treatment bank-industry in the
pre-Settlement period, the more severe were the bank-industry’s relative losses in equity
9

Unreported results using Proxy II are qualitatively similar. Unreported results using subsamples that
include only market share observations from industry-years with at least three equity issuances are also qualitatively similar.
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issuance market share in the post-Settlement period. The results are inconsistent with the
Optimism Hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that the more optimistically biased the
treatment bank-industry’s all-star analysts were in the pre-Settlement period, the more severe would be the bank-industry’s post-Settlement losses in equity issuance market share.
I find results that are the opposite of this prediction.

4.2. Impact of Global Settlement on Cost of Equity Capital
In this section, I test the Changing Risk Hypothesis and the Analyst Lust Hypothesis using
the same difference-in-differences framework with a different dependent variable – the
weighted average underpricing of equity issuances underwritten by a bank in an industry
in a year. Both hypotheses predict a differential effect of the Global Settlement on the cost
of equity capital between issuances with higher valuation risk and issuances with lower
valuation risk, which I evaluate using a triple-difference specification with two measures
of valuation risk. I provide suggestive evidence that, while both hypotheses seem to be
at work, the Changing Risk Hypothesis plays a more important role in the subgroup of
high-valuation-risk IPOs than in the subgroup of low-valuation-risk IPOs, consistent with
the departure of research talent causing the cost of equity capital to rise, especially for
issuances that are intrinsically more difficult to value.
To recall, the Changing Risk Hypothesis considers underpricing from the perspective of
investors, whereas the Analyst Lust Hypothesis considers underpricing from the perspective of issuers. Specifically, the Changing Risk Hypothesis states that, as all-star analysts
depart from the treatment bank-industries in the post-Settlement period, investor clients at
these bank-industries demand more underpricing as compensation for increased valuation
risk, causing the difference in average underpricing between the treatment bank-industries
and the control bank-industries to widen, and to widen more for issuances that are more
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difficult to value. On the other hand, the Analyst Lust Hypothesis states that, as all-star
analysts depart from the treatment bank-industries in the post-Settlement period, issuers
become less willing to tolerate underpricing as compensation to the underwriter for providing high-quality research coverage, causing the difference in average underpricing between
the treatment bank-industries and the control bank-industries to narrow, and to narrow more
for issuances that are more difficult to value.
4.2.1. Tech vs. Non-Tech
The first measure of valuation risk is whether an issuer belongs in a tech industry, assuming
that tech issuances are intrinsically more difficult to value than non-tech issuances. Tech
industries are defined in Section 3.1.3. Table 10 Panel A presents regression results using
this risk measure, represented by an indicator that equals 1 if the corresponding industry
is a tech industry, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on Treatment*Tech*Post is the tripledifference coefficient of interest.
Column (1) shows that results are statistically insignificant for IPO and follow-on underwritings combined. Since secondary offering issuers have been publically traded and have
established a track record, their issuances likely have a low valuation risk profile in general
regardless of the issuer’s industry categorization. I therefore focus on IPO underwritings
alone.
Column (2) shows a positive and statistically significant triple-difference coefficient, which
suggests a positive differential effect of the Global Settlement on the cost of equity capital
between high-valuation-risk IPOs and low-valuation-risk IPOs. This preliminary observation suggests consistency with the Changing Risk Hypothesis. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on Treatment*Post, however, suggests that the effect of the
Analyst Lust Hypothesis dominates in the subgroup of low-valuation-risk IPOs. This re-
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sult is confirmed in column (3), which reports the regular difference-in-differences results
for the subgroup of low-risk IPOs. Column (4) reports the regular difference-in-differences
results for the subgroup of high-risk IPOs. The difference-in-differences coefficient is statistically insignificant, suggesting that the effects of the two hypotheses offset each other. I
infer from this result and from the positive triple-difference coefficient in column (2) that
the effect of the Changing Risk Hypothesis is stronger in the subgroup of high-risk IPOs
than in the subgroup of low-risk IPOs. That is, the departure of research talent has a larger
impact on the decisions of investors in IPOs that are more difficult to value, raising the underpricing of these IPOs more substantially. Importantly, the triple-difference coefficient
in column (2) suggests that the differential effect of the Global Settlement on the cost of
equity capital between high-risk IPOs and low-risk IPOs amounts to an economically significant 17.8% in underpricing, or an average amount of money left on the table of about
$34 million.10
Figure 3 plots average underpricing for the treatment bank-industries and for the control
bank-industries, separately for the low-risk subgroup (i.e., Non-Tech Industries) and for
the high-risk subgroup (i.e., Tech Industries), for each year from 1998 to 2007. First, the
graphs show that the average underpricings of the treatment group and of the control group
behaved similarly prior to the Global Settlement, satisfying the “parallel trends” assumption. Second, the graphs show some evidence that the difference in average underpricing
between the treatment group and the control group widens more for high-risk IPOs than for
low-risk IPOs, consistent with the positive triple-difference coefficient discussed above.
It is, however, not clear from the “Non-Tech” graph that the difference between average
underpricing narrows for the subgroup of low-risk IPOs, as suggested by the regression
results discussed above.
10

A placebo test using the sample period of 1990-1999, "event years" of 1994 and 1995, and the "treatment
group" described in Section 4.1.2 yields statistically insignificant results (not reported).
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Lastly, column (5) in Panel A presents the triple-difference coefficient trend. Statistically
significant coefficients on Treatment*GS(0) and Treatment*Tech*GS(0) suggest that the
effect of the Global Settlement appeared not only after but also during the event years. An
explanation for this result is that investors and issuers likely anticipated the regulation and
its potential impact of causing some of the most highly-regarded and highly-paid analysts to
exit the sell-side research profession. Since a large portion of a research analyst’s service
is provided in the aftermarket, the anticipation of an analyst’s future departure from the
underwriter of an equity offering could affect the decisions of the investors and issuers
prior to, or at the time of, the equity offering.
4.2.2. Issuer Age
The second measure of valuation risk is issuer age, assuming that issuances from younger
issuers are intrinsically more difficult to value than those from older issuers. Table 10 Panel
B presents regression results using this risk measure. The coefficient on Treatment*Avg Issuer Age*Post is the triple-difference coefficient of interest, where Avg Issuer Age is a continuous variable equal to the average issuer age for equity issuances underwritten by a bank
in an industry in a year. Column (1) shows that results are statistically insignificant for IPO
and follow-on underwritings combined. As discussed above, follow-on issuers have traded
securities and are known to the marketplace, mitigating their youth. Column (2) shows
a negative and statistically significant triple-difference coefficient for IPO underwritings,
suggesting a positive differential effect of the Global Settlement on the cost of equity capital between high-valuation-risk IPOs (i.e., from younger issuers) and low-valuation-risk
IPOs (i.e., from older issuers). Specifically, the coefficient of -0.00336 means that a oneyear decrease in average issuer age (i.e., an increase in valuation risk) is associated with
a positive differential effect of 0.336% in underpricing. This result is consistent with the
Changing Risk Hypothesis. Column (3) presents the triple-difference coefficient trend.
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The statistically significant coefficient on Treatment*Avg Issuer Age*GS(0) suggests that
the effect of the Global Settlement appeared not only after but also during the event years.
To compare the triple-difference result (i.e., the differential effect of the Global Settlement
between high-risk IPOs and low-risk IPOs) between Panel A and Panel B, I note that the
standard deviation of Tech is 0.4939, and the standard deviation of Avg Issuer Age is 26.98
(Table 2 Panel A). The triple-difference coefficient of 0.178 in Panel A suggests that a twostandard-deviation increase in Tech from 0 to 1 (i.e., an increase in valuation risk) leads to
a positive differential effect of 17.8% in underpricing. In comparison, the triple-difference
coefficient of -0.00336 in Panel B suggests that a two-standard-deviation decrease in Avg
Issuer Age (i.e., an increase in valuation risk) leads to a positive differential effect of about
18.13% in underpricing. Thus, the two sets of triple-difference results are of comparable
magnitudes.
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Table 3: Effect of Global Settlement on Investment Banking Deal Flow
Panel A reports difference-in-differences results. Panel B reports coefficient dynamics.
Sample period is 1998-2007, with event years 2002 and 2003 excluded from the regression
samples in Panel A and included in the regression samples in Panel B. Results are reported
separately for IPOs and follow-on offerings (SEOs) combined, and for IPOs alone. Regressions (1) and (2) use full samples. Regressions (3) and (4) use subsamples that include only
market share observations computed from industry-years with a total of at least three equity issuances. The dependent variable is industry market share in a given year, calculated
as the gross proceeds raised by an investment bank in a particular industry through deals
in which the investment bank acts as a lead or co-lead manager, divided by the total gross
proceeds of all deals completed in that industry in that year. Treatment is an indicator that
equals 1 for observations in the treatment group, and 0 otherwise. Post is an indicator that
equals 1 for observations from 2004-2007, and 0 for observations from 1998-2001. GS(-1)
is an indicator for one year prior to the event years, GS(0) is an indicator for the event
years, GS(+1) is an indicator for one year after the event years, and GS(2+) is an indicator
for two or more years after the event years. Coefficients are estimated by OLS. All regression specifications include both bank-year and industry-year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the bank level. p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Panel A. Difference-in-Differences Results
(1)
IPOs & SEOs
Full Sample

(2)
(3)
IPOs Only IPOs & SEOs
Full Sample
Subsample

(4)
IPOs Only
Subsample

0.0206***
(0.000)
-0.0296***
(0.000)

0.00930***
(0.001)
-0.0379***
(0.000)

0.0168***
(0.000)
-0.0248***
(0.000)

0.00745***
(0.009)
-0.0294***
(0.000)

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

Sum
F Statistic, Wald Test
Two-Sided p-value

-0.009
4.69
0.0308

-0.0286
21.69
0.000

-0.008
3.75
0.0534

-0.02195
14.99
0.0001

Observations
R-squared Within

4966
0.188

3792
0.195

3924
0.208

2272
0.265

Treatment
Post*Treatment

Bank-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
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Panel B. Coefficient Dynamics
(1)
(2)
IPOs & SEOs IPOs Only
Full Sample Full Sample
Treatment

(3)
IPOs & SEOs
Subsample

(4)
IPOs Only
Subsample

0.0207***
(0.000)
-0.000157
(0.985)
0.00285
(0.692)
-0.0232***
(0.005)
-0.0318***
(0.000)

0.00790**
(0.011)
0.00719
(0.395)
0.00933
(0.268)
-0.0399***
(0.000)
-0.0354***
(0.000)

0.0174***
(0.000)
-0.00211
(0.848)
0.00452
(0.517)
-0.0124
(0.111)
-0.0299***
(0.000)

0.00850***
(0.007)
-0.00794
(0.425)
0.00412
(0.619)
-0.0262***
(0.001)
-0.0323***
(0.001)

Bank-Year FE
Industry-Year FE

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

Observations
R-squared Within

6316
0.176

4589
0.182

4890
0.199

2553
0.260

Treatment*GS(-1)
Treatment*GS(0)
Treatment*GS(+1)
Treatment*GS(2+)
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Figure 1: Market Share of IPOs and Follow-On Offerings, Treatment Group vs. Control
Group
Panel A. Levels
This panel plots the estimated coefficients of the year dummies (plus the intercept) in the
following regression, separately for the treatment group and for the control group:
M arketShareijt = Intercept +

P

t=1999 2007

Y ear_Dummyt +

i

+

j

+

ijt

The dependent variable is market share of IPOs and follow-on offerings of bank i in year t
in industry j. The regression specification includes both bank fixed effects ( i ) and industry
fixed effects ( j ), where industry is defined using 6-digit GICS codes. Sample period is
1998-2007. Coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
bank level.
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Figure 1 (continued)
Panel B. Difference
This panel plots the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms in the following regression:
M arketShareijt =
T reatmentij +

P

T reatmentij

t=1998 2001;2004 2007

+

it

+

jt

+

Y ear_Dummyt

ijt

The dependent variable is market share of IPOs and follow-on offerings of bank i in year
t in industry j. The regression specification includes both bank-year fixed effects ( it ) and
industry-year fixed effects ( jt ), where industry is defined using 6-digit GICS codes. Sample period is 1998-2007. Each point estimate represents the difference in average market
share relative to the event years 2002 and 2003. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence
interval. Coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
bank level.
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Figure 2: Market Share of IPOs, Treatment Group vs. Control Group
Panel A. Levels
This panel plots the estimated coefficients of the year dummies (plus the intercept) in the
following regression, separately for the treatment group and for the control group:
M arketShareijt = Intercept +

P

t=1999 2007

Y ear_Dummyt +

i

+

j

+

ijt

The dependent variable is market share of IPOs of bank i in year t in industry j. The regression specification includes both bank fixed effects ( i ) and industry fixed effects ( j ), where
industry is defined using 6-digit GICS codes. Sample period is 1998-2007. Coefficients
are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
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Figure 2 (continued)
Panel B. Difference
This panel plots the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms in the following regression:

M arketShareijt =
T reatmentij +

P

T reatmentij

t=1998 2001;2004 2007

+

it

+

jt

+

Y ear_Dummyt

ijt

The dependent variable is market share of IPOs of bank i in year t in industry j. The regression specification includes both bank-year fixed effects ( it ) and industry-year fixed effects
( jt ), where industry is defined using 6-digit GICS codes. Sample period is 1998-2007.
Each point estimate represents the difference in average market share relative to the event
years 2002 and 2003. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval. Coefficients are
estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 4: Placebo Test
The placebo sample period is 1990-1999, with “event years” 1994 and 1995 excluded.
Analysis is performed on sixteen investment banks identified to be the then-largest investment banks in the US, based on both the number of equity issuances underwritten and the
equity issuance market share of each bank during 1990-1993. Treatment and control groups
are defined in exactly the same way as in the Global Settlement analysis. Panel A describes
the treatment group for the placebo test. Panel B reports difference-in-differences results,
separately for IPOs and follow-on offerings (SEOs) combined, and for IPOs alone. Regressions (1) and (2) use full samples. Regressions (3) and (4) use subsamples that include only
market share observations computed from industry-years with a total of at least three equity issuances. The dependent variable is industry market share in a given year, calculated
as the gross proceeds raised by an investment bank in a particular industry through deals
in which the investment bank acts as a lead or co-lead manager, divided by the total gross
proceeds of all deals completed in that industry in that year. Treatment is an indicator that
equals 1 for observations in the treatment group, and 0 otherwise. Post is an indicator that
equals 1 for observations from 1996-1999, and 0 for observations from 1990-1993. Coefficients are estimated by OLS. All regression specifications include both bank-year and
industry-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level. p-values
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Panel A. Treatment Group
No. of Industries
with All-Stars

Industry-Year
Observations

Alex. Brown & Sons
Bear Stearns
CS First Boston
Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette
Goldman Sachs
Kidder Peabody
Lehman Brothers
Merrill Lynch
Montgomery Securities
Morgan Stanley
Oppenheimer & Co.
PaineWebber
Prudential Securities
Robertson, Stephens & Co.
Salomon Brothers
Smith Barney Shearson

9
16
38
37
33
31
46
46
10
37
24
28
34
1
28
31

69
120
281
275
245
230
330
332
77
268
176
198
252
8
205
231

Total

449

3297 (45.38%)

Investment Bank

Panel B. Difference-in-Differences Results
(1)
(2)
IPOs & SEOs IPOs Only
Full Sample Full Sample
Treatment

(3)
(4)
IPOs & SEOs IPOs Only
Subsample
Subsample

0.00824
(0.181)
0.00211
(0.769)

0.0136*
(0.054)
-0.00500
(0.434)

0.00935
(0.124)
0.00249
(0.742)

0.0157**
(0.048)
-0.00204
(0.775)

Bank-Year FE
Industry-Year FE

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

Observations
R-squared Within

7265
0.148

6385
0.109

6292
0.179

4754
0.145

Post*Treatment
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Table 5: All-Star Analyst Departures
An all-star analyst’s year of departure from the sell side is first identified as the last year
in which the analyst’s earnings estimates appear in I/B/E/S. This departure year is then
checked against the Analyst Registry from Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research,
which reports, for every year up to 2008, the names and employers of all active sell-side
research analysts. There are a total of 382 all-star analysts in my analysis, who are divided
into three categories as shown in Panel A: 1) Full Departure, or all-star analysts who left
the sell side from their 2001-employer during 2002-2007; 2) Partial Departure, or all-star
analysts who left their 2001-employer to join another sell-side security firm during 20022007, regardless of whether they eventually left the sell side; and 3) No Departure, or
all-star analysts who stayed at their 2001-employer throughout the period of 2002-2007.
Panel B translates the three all-star analyst categories from Panel A into three bank-industry
categories: 1) Full Departure, or bank-industries that had at least one all-star analyst who
left the sell side from their 2001-employer during 2002-2007; 2) Partial Departure, or bankindustries that had at least one all-star analyst who left their 2001-employer to join another
sell-side security firm during 2002-2007, but not all-star analysts who left the sell side
altogether; and 3) No Departure, or bank-industries whose all-star analysts stayed at their
2001-employer throughout the period of 2002-2007. Panel C reports the number of all-star
analyst departures from the sell side (see Panel A, Full Departure) by year from 2002 to
2007.
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Panel A. Categories of All-Star Analysts
No. of All-Stars
Full Departure
217
Partial Departure
64
No Departure
101
Total
382
Panel B. Categories of Bank-Industries
No. of Bank-Industries
Full Departure
233
Partial Departure
44
No Departure
64
Total
341
Panel C. Full Departures by Year
No. of Departures
2002
52
2003
50
2004
45
2005
22
2006
24
2007
24
Total
217
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Percentage of All-Stars (%)
56.81
16.75
26.44
100.00

Percentage of Bank-Industries (%)
68.33
12.9
18.77
100.00

Percentage of Departures (%)
23.96
23.04
20.74
10.14
11.06
11.06
100.00

Table 6: Repeat All-Stars
This table reports difference-in-differences results obtained by distinguishing between repeat all-stars and non-repeat all-stars. Sample period is 1998-2007, with event years 2002
and 2003 excluded from the regression samples. Results are reported separately for IPOs
and follow-on offerings (SEOs) combined, and for IPOs alone. Regressions (1) and (2)
use full samples. Regressions (3) and (4) use subsamples that include only market share
observations computed from industry-years with a total of at least three equity issuances.
The dependent variable is industry market share in a given year. Post is an indicator that
equals 1 for observations from 2004-2007, and 0 for observations from 1998-2001. Panel
A reports difference-in-differences results using two treatment subgroups. Treatment Grp
1 is an indicator for bank-industries whose all-star analysts were named all-stars for an
average of one to two times during 1998-2001, and Treatment Grp 2 is an indicator for
bank-industries whose all-star analysts were named all-stars for an average of three to four
times during 1998-2001. Difference (1-2) is computed by subtracting the coefficient on
Post*Treatment Grp 2 from the coefficient on Post*Treatment Grp 1. Wald test examines whether Difference (1-2) is statistically significantly different from 0. Panel B reports
difference-in-differences results using four treatment subgroups. Treatment Grp 1 is an indicator for bank-industries whose all-star analysts were named all-stars for an average of
one to two times during 1994-2001, Treatment Grp 2 is an indicator for bank-industries
whose all-star analysts were named all-stars for an average of three to four times during
1994-2001, Treatment Grp 3 is an indicator for bank-industries whose all-star analysts
were named all-stars for an average of five to six times during 1994-2001, and Treatment
Grp 4 is an indicator for bank-industries whose all-star analysts were named all-stars for
an average of seven to eight times during 1994-2001. Difference (1-4) is computed by subtracting the coefficient on Post*Treatment Grp 4 from the coefficient on Post*Treatment
Grp 1. Wald test examines whether Difference (1-4) is statistically significantly different
from 0. Coefficients are estimated by OLS. All regression specifications include both bankyear and industry-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Panel A. Two Treatment Groups
(1)
IPOs & SEOs
Full Sample

(2)
(3)
IPOs Only IPOs & SEOs
Full Sample
Subsample

(4)
IPOs Only
Subsample

0.0129**
(0.021)
0.0255***
(0.000)
-0.0235***
(0.002)
-0.0324***
(0.000)

0.00930***
(0.002)
0.00930***
(0.004)
-0.0365***
(0.000)
-0.0399***
(0.000)

0.0101*
(0.093)
0.0213***
(0.000)
-0.0193***
(0.002)
-0.0274***
(0.000)

0.00715*
(0.057)
0.00764***
(0.004)
-0.0276***
(0.009)
-0.0316***
(0.000)

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

Difference (1-2)
F Statistic, Wald Test
Two-Sided p-value

0.0089
2.85
0.0919

0.0034
0.34
0.559

0.0081
1.8
0.1808

0.004
0.17
0.6796

Observations
R-squared Within

4966
0.189

3792
0.195

3924
0.209

2272
0.265

Treatment Grp 1
Treatment Grp 2
Post*Treatment Grp 1
Post*Treatment Grp 2

Bank-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
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Panel B. Four Treatment Groups
(1)
IPOs & SEOs
Full Sample

(2)
(3)
IPOs Only IPOs & SEOs
Full Sample
Subsample

(4)
IPOs Only
Subsample

0.00952***
(0.010)
0.0139
(0.132)
0.0349***
(0.000)
0.0230***
(0.000)
-0.0235***
(0.002)
-0.0245**
(0.018)
-0.0360***
(0.000)
-0.0292**
(0.034)

0.00340
(0.504)
0.0114**
(0.018)
0.0137***
(0.005)
0.00692**
(0.014)
-0.0344***
(0.000)
-0.0370***
(0.000)
-0.0362***
(0.009)
-0.0432***
(0.001)

0.00844**
(0.043)
0.0111
(0.112)
0.0305***
(0.000)
0.0189***
(0.003)
-0.0201***
(0.006)
-0.0205***
(0.003)
-0.0323***
(0.000)
-0.0245**
(0.023)

-0.00147
(0.803)
0.00794**
(0.039)
0.0133**
(0.019)
0.00921***
(0.003)
-0.0206*
(0.058)
-0.0297***
(0.000)
-0.0314**
(0.019)
-0.0364***
(0.001)

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

Difference (1-4)
F Statistic, Wald Test
Two-Sided p-value

0.0057
0.29
0.5879

0.0088
0.42
0.5191

0.0044
0.22
0.6387

0.0158
1.4
0.2384

Observations
R-squared Within

4966
0.191

3792
0.197

3924
0.211

2272
0.267

Treatment Grp 1
Treatment Grp 2
Treatment Grp 3
Treatment Grp 4
Post*Treatment Grp 1
Post*Treatment Grp 2
Post*Treatment Grp 3
Post*Treatment Grp 4

Bank-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
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Table 7: Analyst Quality – Descriptive Statistics
Panel A reports descriptive statistics on all-star analysts’ quality calculated using data from
1998-2001. To compute an analyst’s Forecast Accuracy, a scoring methodology is used
to compute the analyst’s forecast accuracy score for each firm in each year. The analyst’s
Forecast Accuracy score is then computed by averaging the analyst’s scores during 19982001 (Proxy I), or by counting the proportion of the analyst’s scores during 1998-2001 that
are 50 or higher (Proxy II). Coverage Frequency, Coverage Timeliness, Forecast Optimism,
and Abnormal Recommendation Levels are computed in a similar way. Reputation is the
average of Forecast Accuracy, Coverage Frequency, and Coverage Timeliness. Bias is the
average of Forecast Optimism and Abnormal Recommendation Levels. Reputation-Bias is
computed by subtracting Bias from Reputation. For each quality measure, percentiles of
all-star analysts are obtained by ranking all analysts that exist in I/B/E/S during 1998-2001
based on their scores. Column A reports the average percentile of all-star analysts. Column
B reports the percentage of all-star analysts with a percentile of 50 or higher. Panel B
compares average analyst quality between the treatment group and the control group using
the composite quality measures calculated using data from 1998-2001. The last column
reports p-values from t-tests comparing the mean values between the treatment group and
the control group. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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Panel A. All-Star Analyst Quality
(1)
Average Percentile
of All-Stars (%)

(2)
Percentage of All-Stars with
Percentile >=50 (%)

Proxy I
Forecast Accuracy
Coverage Frequency
Coverage Timeliness
Reputation

56.20
74.47
66.23
72.06

66.57
90.91
83.58
88.56

Forecast Optimism
Abnormal Recommendation Levels
Bias

44.85
48.97
46.51

37.83
49.85
42.52

Reputation-Bias

66.85

79.77

Proxy II
Forecast Accuracy
Coverage Frequency
Coverage Timeliness
Reputation

54.73
71.92
63.24
69.94

63.93
88.56
78.59
87.10

Forecast Optimism
Abnormal Recommendation Levels
Bias

43.48
46.28
44.59

38.12
44.87
41.64

Reputation-Bias

66.19

78.89
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Panel B. Composite Proxies, Treatment vs. Control

Proxy I
Reputation
Bias
Reputation-Bias

Proxy II
Reputation
Bias
Reputation-Bias

(1)
Treatment
Group

(2)
Control
Group

(3)

(4)

Difference

p-value

51.19
(2.995)
48.84
(4.489)
2.389
(5.586)

50.43
(3.932)
51.65
(7.253)
-0.4536
(10.85)

0.7625

0.003

-2.807

0.000

2.842

0.000

0.5417
(0.04443)
0.5229
(0.06957)
0.01904
(0.08266)

0.5341
(0.05641)
0.5606
(0.0965)
-0.01854
(0.1344)

0.007553

0.043

-0.03766

0.000

0.03757

0.000
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Table 8: Analyst Quality – Regression Results
This table reports difference-in-differences results obtained by distinguishing between allstar analysts of “high” and “low” quality levels, where analyst quality is measured using
Proxy I (Table 7). Sample period is 1998-2007, with event years 2002 and 2003 excluded
from the regression samples. Panel A reports results on IPOs and follow-on offerings
(SEOs) combined. Panel B reports results on IPOs alone. The dependent variable is industry market share in a given year. Post is an indicator that equals 1 for observations
from 2004-2007, and 0 for observations from 1998-2001. Low Accuracy is an indicator
that equals 1 if the average forecast accuracy percentile of all-star analysts in the given
bank-industry is below 50, and 0 otherwise. High Accuracy is an indicator that equals 1 if
the average forecast accuracy percentile of all-star analysts in the given bank-industry is 50
or above, and 0 otherwise. Similarly for Low Frequency and High Frequency, Low Timeliness and High Timeliness, Low Optimism and High Optimism, and Low Recommendation
and High Recommendation. Wald test compares the two interaction term coefficients. Coefficients are estimated by OLS. All regression specifications include both bank-year and
industry-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level. p-values
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Panel A. IPOs & SEOs
(1)
Low Accuracy
High Accuracy
Post*Low Accuracy
Post*High Accuracy

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0204***
(0.002)
0.0207***
(0.000)
-0.0252***
(0.005)
-0.0320***
(0.000)

Low Frequency

0.0290
(0.153)
0.0198***
(0.000)
-0.0312
(0.263)
-0.0297***
(0.000)

High Frequency
Post*Low Frequency
Post*High Frequency
Low Timeliness

0.0305***
(0.003)
0.0188***
(0.000)
-0.0379*
(0.100)
-0.0281***
(0.000)

High Timeliness
Post*Low Timeliness
Post*High Timeliness
Low Optimism

0.0251***
(0.000)
0.0143***
(0.005)
-0.0340***
(0.000)
-0.0233***
(0.001)

High Optimism
Post*Low Optimism
Post*High Optimism
Low Recommendation

0.0156**
(0.010)
0.0254***
(0.002)
-0.0344***
(0.000)
-0.0247***
(0.002)

High Recommendation
Post*Low Recommendation
Post*High Recommendation

Bank-Year FE
Industry-Year FE

(5)

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

F Statistic, Wald Test
Two-Sided p-value

0.77
0.3802

0
0.9549

0.22
0.636

2.26
0.1333

1.21
0.2724

Observations
R-squared Within

4966
0.188

4966
0.188

4966
0.188

4966
0.189

4966
0.191
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Panel B. IPOs Only
(1)
Low Accuracy
High Accuracy
Post*Low Accuracy
Post*High Accuracy

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.00712**
(0.022)
0.0106***
(0.001)
-0.0245***
(0.004)
-0.0463***
(0.000)

Low Frequency

0.00554**
(0.034)
0.0110***
(0.001)
-0.0293***
(0.000)
-0.0421***
(0.000)

High Frequency
Post*Low Frequency
Post*High Frequency
Low Timeliness

0.0124
(0.157)
0.00876***
(0.001)
-0.0446***
(0.007)
-0.0367***
(0.000)

High Timeliness
Post*Low Timeliness
Post*High Timeliness
Low Optimism

0.0142***
(0.001)
0.00309
(0.229)
-0.0423***
(0.000)
-0.0325***
(0.000)

High Optimism
Post*Low Optimism
Post*High Optimism
Low Recommendation

0.0103**
(0.013)
0.00840***
(0.002)
-0.0431***
(0.000)
-0.0331***
(0.000)

High Recommendation
Post*Low Recommendation
Post*High Recommendation

Bank-Year FE
Industry-Year FE

(5)

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

F Statistic, Wald Test
Two-Sided p-value

5.81
0.0164

3.22
0.0735

0.3
0.5861

2.84
0.0928

2.33
0.1273

Observations
R-squared Within

3792
0.199

3792
0.196

3792
0.195

3792
0.196

3792
0.196
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Table 9: Analyst Quality, Composite Measures – Regression Results
This table reports difference-in-differences results obtained by distinguishing between allstar analysts of “high” and “low” quality levels, where analyst quality is measured using
the composite Proxy I (Table 7). Sample period is 1998-2007, with event years 2002 and
2003 excluded from the regression samples. Regressions (1)-(3) report results on IPOs and
follow-on offerings (SEOs) combined. Regressions (4)-(6) report results on IPOs alone.
The dependent variable is industry market share in a given year. Post is an indicator that
equals 1 for observations from 2004-2007, and 0 for observations from 1998-2001. Low
Reputation is an indicator that equals 1 if the average Reputation percentile of all-star
analysts in the given broker-industry is below 50, and 0 otherwise. High Reputation is an
indicator that equals 1 if the average Reputation percentile of all-star analysts in the given
broker-industry is 50 or above, and 0 otherwise. Similarly for Low Bias and High Bias, and
Low ‘Reputation-Bias’ and High ‘Reputation-Bias’. Wald test compares the two interaction
term coefficients. Coefficients are estimated by OLS. All regression specifications include
both bank-year and industry-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
bank level. p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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69
YES
YES
0.7
0.4029
4966
0.188

F Statistic, Wald Test
Two-Sided p-value

Observations
R-squared Within

0.0200*
(0.062)
0.0207***
(0.000)
-0.0204
(0.199)
-0.0311***
(0.000)

Bank-Year FE
Industry-Year FE

Post*High ’Reputation-Bias’

Post*Low ’Reputation-Bias’

High ’Reputation-Bias’

Low ’Reputation-Bias’

Post*High Bias

Post*Low Bias

High Bias

Low Bias

Post*High Reputation

Post*Low Reputation

High Reputation

Low Reputation

(1)

4966
0.189

2.03
0.1545

YES
YES

0.0214***
(0.000)
0.0196***
(0.002)
-0.0364***
(0.001)
-0.0209***
(0.004)

IPOs & SEOs
(2)

4966
0.189

0.32
0.5698

YES
YES

0.0223**
(0.049)
0.0201***
(0.000)
-0.0226
(0.136)
-0.0318***
(0.000)

(3)

3792
0.195

2.9
0.0894

YES
YES

0.00482
(0.123)
0.0105***
(0.002)
-0.0294***
(0.000)
-0.0404***
(0.000)

(4)

3792
0.196

3.83
0.0509

YES
YES

0.0118***
(0.000)
0.00686**
(0.011)
-0.0445***
(0.000)
-0.0303***
(0.000)

IPOs Only
(5)

3792
0.197

4.67
0.0313

YES
YES

0.00883*
(0.062)
0.00949***
(0.001)
-0.0272***
(0.002)
-0.0425***
(0.000)

(6)

Table 10: Effect of Global Settlement on Cost of Equity Capital
Sample period is 1998-2007. The dependent variable is the weighted average underpricing of equity issuances underwritten by a bank in an industry in a year; the higher the
number of lead or co-lead managers in an issuance, the lower is the weight given to the
underpricing of that issuance. Underpricing of an issuance, or first-day return, is defined
as the percentage change from the offer price to the first-day closing price. Treatment is an
indicator that equals 1 for observations in the treatment group, and 0 otherwise. Post is an
indicator that equals 1 for observations from 2004-2007, and 0 for observations from 19982001. GS(-1) is an indicator for one year prior to the event years, GS(0) is an indicator
for the event years, GS(+1) is an indicator for one year after the event years, and GS(2+)
is an indicator for two or more years after the event years. Panel A reports regression results using the first valuation risk measure, namely, whether an issuance belongs in a tech
industry. Tech is an indicator that equals 1 if the corresponding industry is a tech industry, and 0 otherwise. Column (1) reports triple-difference regression results for IPOs and
follow-on offerings (SEOs) combined. Column (2)-(5) report regression results for IPOs
alone. Column (2) reports triple-difference regression results. Column (3) and (4) report
difference-in-differences results for non-tech and tech issuances, respectively. Column (5)
reports triple-difference coefficient dynamics. Event years 2002 and 2003 are excluded in
the regression samples in column (1)-(4), and included in the regression sample in column
(5). Panel B reports regression results using the second valuation risk measure, namely,
issuer age. Avg Issuer Age is a continuous variable equal to the average issuer age of equity issuances underwritten by a bank in an industry in a year, where the age of an issuer
is defined as the difference between the issuer’s founding year and the year of the public
offering. Column (1) reports triple-difference regression results for IPOs and follow-on offerings (SEOs) combined. Column (2) reports triple-difference regression results for IPOs
alone. Column (3) reports triple-difference coefficient dynamics for IPOs alone. Event
years 2002 and 2003 are excluded in the regression samples in column (1)-(2), and included in the regression sample in column (3). Coefficients are estimated by OLS. All
regression specifications include both bank-year and industry-year fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the bank level. p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Panel A. Tech vs. Non-Tech

Treatment
Treatment*Post
Treatment*Tech
Treatment*Tech*Post

IPOs & SEOs
(1)
Full
Sample

(2)
Full
Sample

0.000672
(0.964)
-0.0112
(0.567)
0.0105
(0.739)
0.00168
(0.961)

0.0730
(0.124)
-0.117***
(0.004)
-0.131***
(0.008)
0.178***
(0.003)

IPOs Only
(3)
(4)
NonTech
Tech
0.135*
(0.061)
-0.171**
(0.016)

-0.0681
(0.621)
0.0532
(0.715)

(5)
Coefficient
Dynamics
0.0625
(0.288)

-0.134**
(0.014)

Treatment*GS(-1)

0.0257
(0.819)
-0.121*
(0.090)
-0.0488
(0.533)
-0.125**
(0.038)
0.0255
(0.769)
0.236***
(0.000)
0.148*
(0.062)
0.193***
(0.006)

Treatment*GS(0)
Treatment*GS(+1)
Treatment*GS(2+)
Treatment*Tech*GS(-1)
Treatment*Tech*GS(0)
Treatment*Tech*GS(+1)
Treatment*Tech*GS(2+)

Bank-Year FE
Industry-Year FE

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

Observations
R-squared Within

2161
0.373

1105
0.546

640
0.604

465
0.589

1250
0.551
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Panel B. Issuer Age

Treatment
Avg Issuer Age
Treatment*Post
Avg Issuer Age*Post
Treatment*Avg Issuer Age
Treatment*Avg Issuer Age*Post

IPOs & SEOs
(1)

(2)

IPOs Only
(3)

0.00490
(0.815)
-0.000289
(0.588)
-0.00594
(0.816)
0.0000290
(0.941)
-0.000179
(0.800)
-0.00000385
(0.995)

-0.0209
(0.808)
-0.00142
(0.515)
0.0328
(0.718)
0.00246
(0.241)
0.00160
(0.358)
-0.00336*
(0.077)

Treatment*GS(-1)

-0.0273
(0.769)
-0.00193
(0.452)

0.00218
(0.278)

-0.0528
(0.700)
0.150*
(0.064)
0.0759
(0.544)
0.0259
(0.787)
0.00153
(0.682)
0.00240
(0.308)
0.00149
(0.704)
0.00317
(0.203)
-0.00208
(0.516)
-0.00396**
(0.016)
-0.00446
(0.202)
-0.00371*
(0.085)

Treatment*GS(0)
Treatment*GS(+1)
Treatment*GS(2+)
Avg Issuer Age*GS(-1)
Avg Issuer Age*GS(0)
Avg Issuer Age*GS(+1)
Avg Issuer Age*GS(2+)
Treatment*Avg Issuer Age*GS(-1)
Treatment*Avg Issuer Age*GS(0)
Treatment*Avg Issuer Age*GS(+1)
Treatment*Avg Issuer Age*GS(2+)

Bank-Year FE
Industry-Year FE

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

Observations
R-squared Within

1772
0.410

1050
0.550

1179
0.555
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Tech Industries ('Tech'=1)
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Figure 3: Underpricing of IPOs, Non-Tech vs. Tech, Treatment Group vs. Control Group

This figure plots, separately for non-tech industries and for tech industries, the estimated
coefficients of the year dummies (plus the intercept) in the following regression, separately
for the treatment group and for the control group:
U nderpricingijt = Intercept +

P

t=1999 2007

Y ear_Dummyt +

i

+

j

+

ijt

The dependent variable is weighted average underpricing of IPOs of bank i in year t in
industry j. The regression specification includes both bank fixed effects ( i ) and industry
fixed effects ( j ), where industry is defined using 6-digit GICS codes. Sample period is
1998-2007. Coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
bank level.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
The Global Settlement banned research analyst participation in investment banking business and prohibited investment banks from linking research analysts’ compensation to analysts’ investment banking contributions. Perhaps due to a steep decline in compensation and career prospects, an exceptionally large number of all-star analysts – as named
by Institutional Investor magazine in the pre-Settlement period – departed from the sellside research industry in the post-Settlement period. Since equity issuers place a high
value on research coverage from all-star analysts – who on average exhibit superior performance compared to non-all-star analysts – the departure of all-star analysts caused their
bank-industry underwriting groups to lose equity issuance market share, relative to bankindustry groups that did not have all-star analysts to begin with. Market share losses were
more severe for IPO underwritings than for IPO and follow-on underwritings combined,
likely due to the stickiness of underwriting relationships. The higher the average quality of
all-star analysts in a bank-industry in the pre-Settlement period, the more severe were the
bank-industry’s post-Settlement losses. The departure of all-star analysts also raised the
cost of equity capital for IPOs underwritten by their bank-industry underwriting groups,
particularly for IPOs that were intrinsically difficult to value, such as those of technology
companies, due to IPO investors seeking compensation for increased valuation risk arising
from the loss of high-quality research.
High-quality research coverage enhances the efficient operation of the capital markets and
of the real economy. The disappearance of high-quality sell-side equity research coverage,
as an unintended consequence of well-intentioned regulation, however, has forced issuing
companies to accept research coverage of inferior quality. Do the Global Settlement and related SRO regulations deter companies from going public or from obtaining public capital?
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Has the deterrence effect been stronger on companies with higher valuation risk, including
the technology companies that represent the vanguard of the American economy? How
have these regulations affected other aspects of investment banking business, including
debt issuances and mergers and acquisitions? More broadly, how have these regulations,
and particularly their resultant decline in research analyst quality, altered companies’ capital markets behavior? How do these changes in capital markets decision patterns affect the
real economy? Future research answering these follow-up questions may provide further
insights into the effects of these regulations and may have important policy implications.
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